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I. INTRODUCTION
Pharmatech, a pharmaceutical corporation, needed a larger building to
house its growing office staff.' After discussing among its board members the
options of how to construct such a structure, Pharmatech decided to engage
Archiwerks to act as its project architect for its new headquarters. 2 The two
parties used a standard form contract. After Archiwerks had completed the
construction documents, Pharmatech solicited bids from general contractors in
the area. After reviewing the completed bids, Pharmatech selected the low
bidder, Capital Construction, to perform construction services as its general
contractor on the project. Pharmatech and Capital also engaged in a standard
form contract.
The plans for the headquarters depicted a structure enclosed with a glass
wall system. The specifications for the frames of the wall system called for
stainless steel "or approved equal. " 3 Pursuant to its contract with Pharmatech,
Archiwerks observed the construction process once the project had been awarded
to Capital. This observatory role included approving shop drawings which
Capital submitted.4
On the shop drawings which Capital submitted to
Archiwerks for the frames of the glass wall system, "painless" steel was
depicted. "Painless" was a trade name for a new material which had only
recently been marketed in the construction industry. The manufacturers of
"painless" claimed that its product had all the characteristics of stainless steel.
The most important of these characteristics was its resistance to corrosion.
Because "painless" had such qualities and could be manufactured at roughly half
the cost of stainless steel, Capital had recently used "painless" on another
project in the same geographic area as Pharmatech's new headquarters with
favorable results.

1. This fact pattern is a hypothetical scenario based upon theories developed in previous cases
in the construction context. See infra note 6.
2. Archiwerks, as project architect, would develop a design for the building with detailed
drawings called construction documents, from which the building would actually be built. These
construction documents, or plans, along with specifications, contracts and other addenda together
form contract documents. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
3. "Equals" are allowances made by the architect for the contractor to provide alternatives to
a brand specified in the plans and specifications. Normally, if an architect specifies a brand name
of a product, such an allowance would be made as long as the performance of that allowance, or
"equal," met the performance criteria set forth in the specifications. This type of specification is
commonly known in the industry as a "performance specification." For a discussion of performance
specifications, consult RICHARD PATRICK MAHER, INTRODUCTION TO CONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS

221-41 (1982).
4. These are detailed drawings which depict how Capital planned to fabricate the various
components of the building. They are prepared by the contractor or the manufacturer. See infra
note 32 and accompanying text (discussing shop drawings and submittals).
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Archiwerks was unfamiliar with "painless." Although the manufacturers
claimed that it was noncorrosive, little testing had been conducted to determine
whether the product could withstand the Midwestern climate which the
headquarters would have to endure.' Since Archiwerks felt that data in this
regard was not sufficiently extensive, it decided to delay approving the shop
drawings until further testing could be conducted. The delay was effectuated by
Archiwerks notwithstanding assurances from the manufacturer and protests from
Capital. The testing took several months to complete. The results of the tests
proved Capital's thesis-"painless" was as good as stainless steel.
As a result of the delay, Capital incurred considerable costs in testing as
well as lost profits. The specifications, requiring approval of "equals," did not
specify any tests that would have to be performed. In this regard, the
specifications may have been ambiguous. Capital decided to sue Archiwerks for
damages that Capital incurred as a result of the delay. The theory was that the
specifications, because ambiguous, were negligently drafted. As a result of this
negligence, Capital was harmed by having to pay for additional testing
procedures it did not anticipate performing when it submitted its bid to
Pharmatech for the project.6
The damages suffered by Capital in this hypothetical scenario can be
described as pure economic loss. 7 These losses are contract-type losses

5. Examples of such tests are found in the ANNUAL BOOK OF ASTM STANDARDS, Vol. 01.01
(1986). ASTM A789 and A632 deal with chemical composition and testing procedures for stainless
steel tubing.
6. If specifications are ambiguous, the act or omission of the architect giving rise to the
ambiguity constitutes a breach of the professional standard of care. G. William Quatman, Liability
ofArchitects and Engineeersto Third Parties, in DESIGN PROFESSIONAL'S HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS
AND LAw 561, 567 (Robert F. Cushman & James C. Dobbs eds., 1991). Cases dealing specifically
with the problem of negligently drafted specifications are legion. See, e.g., Associated Architects
& Eng'rs v. Lubbock Glass & Mirror Co., 422 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. App. 1967); R.H. Macy & Co.
v. Williams Tile & Terrazzo Co., 585 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Floor Craft Floor Covering,
Inc. v. Parma Community Gen. Hoap. Ass'n, 560 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio 1990); Waldor Pump & Equip.
Co. v. Orr-Schelen-Mayeron & Assocs., 386 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Lutz Eng'g Co.
v. Industrial Louvers, Inc., 585 A.2d 631 (R.I. 1991). See also infra note 187 and accompanying
text.
7. Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, 620 So. 2d 1244, 1246 (Fla.
1993). The types of economic losses include: (1) inadequate value; (2) costs of repair and
replacement of the defective product; (3) consequent loss of profits. Note, Economic Loss in
Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 917, 918 (1966). Economic losses in the
hypothetical scenario described in the Introduction are the commercial expectations of the contractor.
Id. The first type of economic loss, inadequate value, includes diminution in value based on
defectiveness. Comment, Manufacturers' Liability to Remote Purchasersfor "Economic Loss"
Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 539, 541 (1966); See generally Note,
ArchitecturalMalpractice:A Contract-BasedApproach,92 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1979) [hereinafter
ArchitecturalMalpractice]; ROBERT F. CUSHMAN & G. CHRISTIAN HEDEMANN, ARCHITECT AND
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amounting to disappointed commercial expectations and are distinct from
In a majority of jurisdictions, the
personal injury or property damage!
economic losses described in this hypothetical scenario have been allowed in
actions by contractors against architects if negligence can be proved.' Recovery
is allowed despite the lack of privity' ° between the contractor and the
architect. "
This Note argues that recovery of economic loss by contractors from
architects, even when architects are negligent, creates a problem for the entire
construction industry and should be avoided. The problem is that the adversarial
relationship designed by the owner between architect and contractor is
compromised when the architect is forced to consider the commercial
expectations of the contractor. Therefore, the architect should have no duty in
tort to protect against the economic loss of the contractor in this adversarial
system and a per se rule should be adopted barring recovery. This notion
squares with other professions such as accounting and law. Professionals in
those areas, if meant by their clients to have an adversarial relationship with
third parties, are not forced to consider the commercial expectations of those
third parties.
This Note analyzes the hypothetical scenario described above in light of

ENGINEER LIABILITY: CLAIMS AGAINST DESIGN PROFESSIONALS 122-25 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing

the problems surrounding liability for economic loss in the construction context).
"[E]conomic loss describes those damages falling on the contract side of 'the line between tort
and contract . . . .'
Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 881 P.2d 986,
990 (Wash. 1994) (internal citations omitted). Consequential loss is usually based on the theory that
an act or omission of the architect caused delay. For a discussion of the difficulties in determining
causation in construction delay, see THEODORE J. TRAUNER, JR., CONSTRUCTION DELAYS (1990);
RICHARD H. CLOUGH, CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTING 103-04 (2d ed. 1969) (discussing cases in
which delay allows a contractor more time as well as consequential damages in cases where the

contract provides for it).
8. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 450 (IIl. 1982).
9. Quatman, supra note 6, at 572.
10. Privity (of contract):

That connection or relationship which exists between two or more contracting parties.
It was traditionally essential to the maintenance of an action on any contract that there
should subsist such privity between the plaintiff and defendant in respect of the matter
sued on. However, the absence of privity as a defense in actions for damages in
contract and tort actions is generally no longer viable with the enactment of warranty
statutes (see e.g. U.C.C. § 2-318.. .), acceptance by states of doctrine of strict liability
...and court decisions (e.g. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., . . . 111 N.E. 1050
[N.Y. 1916]) which have extended the right to sue for injuries or damages to third party
beneficiaries, and even innocent bystanders ....
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1199 (6th ed. 1990).
11. Quatman, supra note 6, at 561, 572. See generally Frank D. Wagner, Annotation, Tort
Liability of ProjectArchitect for Economic Damages Suffered by Contractor,65 A.L.R. 3D. 249
(1975).
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developments in the law disfavoring as well as favoring liability and concludes
that architects should not be held liable for pure economic loss of contractors.
In Part II.A, this Note traces the historical development of the relationships
among those in the construction industry. 2 Then Part I.1B surveys how courts
have viewed economic loss in products liability cases. 3 Part II.C demonstrates
how this rationale regarding economic loss has been applied in the construction
industry.' 4 Part III analyzes the economic loss doctrine, the minority position
in the construction context."5 In Part III.A, this Note discusses various
conceptions of the doctrine.' 6 In Part III.B, this Note presents ways in which
plaintiffs injurisdictions that employ the economic loss doctrine contend that the
doctrine does not reach their loss. 7 In Part IV, this Note analyzes various
theories which, collectively, allow a cause of action by contractors against
architects for economic loss.'" These theories include the contract theory of
third party beneficiary, discussed in Part IV.A, 19 and the tort theories of
negligence and negligent misrepresentation, discussed in Part IV.B. One or
more of these theories are in force in a majority of jurisdictions. In Part IV.C
this Note discusses the rationale for rejecting the economic loss doctrine in the
2
construction context. '
Finally, Part V introduces a way to view economic losses in light of the
relationships among those in the construction industry.' This Note proposes
a test to determine whether to impute a duty on the part of architects to protect
against third party economic loss. The reasoning behind this test, which will be
proved as viable based on its application to relationships in other professions,
will aid courts in concluding that a duty in tort should not lie with an architect
to protect the commercial expectations of contractors. Thus, whether a contract
analysis or tort analysis is engaged, economic loss by contractors should not be
recoverable from architects when contractors and architects are meant by owners
to be adversaries.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See infra notes 23-51 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 52-73 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 82-176 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 82-134 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 135-76 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 177-267 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 188-209 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 210-60 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 261-67 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 268-93 and accompanying text.
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II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Survey of the Means of Construction
The traditional delivery system of construction contracts,' described in
the introductory hypothetical scenario, involves relationships" among owner,
design professional,' and contractor, and is the most common means by which
buildings are built.' Standard form contracts, including the B14127 and the
9
A201,' both published by the American Institute of Architects (AIA),
usually define the relationships among these parties. Under this system, an
owner retains an architect for preparation of plans and specifications, 3' and
then procures a contractor through a process of competitive bidding to construct
the building according to the contract documents. 3 Once construction has
commenced, the architect typically acts as the owner's agent to observe the
progress of the construction, approve shop drawings and submittals, 32 and to

23. JUSTIN SWEET, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEEMINGAND THE CONSTRUCTION

PROCESS 104-11, 354-55 (5th ed. 1994). The traditional delivery system also includes other parties
such as consultants, subcontractors, lenders, insurers and sureties, but those groups are not analyzed
with any detail in this note.
24. See infra APPENDIX A.
25. The term "design professional" includes architects as well as engineers. Berschauer/Phillips
Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 881 P.2d 986, 990 (Wash. 1994). Thus, although
"architect" is used more often throughout this note, "engineer" could be used interchangeably.
26. See SWEET, supra note 23, at 108.
27. B141 Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Architect (14th ed. 1987)
[hereinafter B141].
28. A201 General Conditions of the Contract for Construction (14th ed. 1987) [hereinafter

A201].
29. See generally AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, THE HANDBOOK OF ARCHITECTURAL
PRACTICE (6th ed. 1951) [hereinafter AIA HANDBOOK].
30. B141, supra note 27,
2.2, 2.3, 2.4. Plans and specifications are part of what are
collectively referred to as contract documents. A201, supra note 28, 1 1.1.1. For a discussion of
contract documents, see CLOUGH,supra note 7, at 88.
31. B141, supra note 27, 1 2.5.1. See also CLOUGH, supra note 7, at 87; AIA HANDBOOK,
supra note 29, at 48.
32. Shop drawings are the most common form of submittals. SWEET, supra note 23, at 220.
Submittals include product data such as "illustrations, standard schedules, performance charts,
instructions, brochures, diagrams and other information" which illustrate the equipment or materials
that the contractor proposes to employ to actually build the structure. A210, supra note 28,
3.12.2. Shop drawings "instruct the fabrication 'shop' how to fabricate component parts." SWEET,
supra note 23, at 220. These drawings are defined as data prepared especially for the project at
hand "to illustrate some portion of the [w]ork." A201, supra note 28, 13.12.1. Another type of
submittal is samples, which are physical examples of "materials, equipment or workmanship [which]
establish standards by which the [wlork will be judged." 1d. 1 3.12.3. See also AIA HANDBOOK,
supra note 29, at 35-37.
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certify payment from the owner to the contractor.33 One aspect of the
traditional delivery system which is immediately apparent is the lack of
contractual privity between an architect and a contractor." An owner selects
a system with a lack of such privity mainly for economic reasons." First,
competitive bidding among prospective contractors helps to ensure the lowest
possible price for the project.'
Second, because the contractor has a profit
motive,37 the architect, as the owner's agent, acts as a check on the contractor
to insure that the contractor does not overcharge the owner in building the
project or deviate from the contract documents in constructing the building. 8
Disadvantages of the traditional delivery system include the fact that the project
takes longer to build, and complaints which often arise between the architect and
the contractor about alleged improper performance of each other's duties. 9
Variations on the traditional delivery system include construction
management, 4 turnkey, 41 and design/build.42 The main difference between
these modem variations and the traditional system is the contractual relationship
between the owner and the others involved in the process. 43 For example, in
the design/build variation, the owner is no longer in privity with an architect or
33. B141, supra note 27, 12.6. See also AIA HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 20-21; CLOUGH,
supra note 7, at 106-07. For a discussion of the payment certification process see MAHER, supra
note 3, at 259-74; CLOUGH, supra note 7, at 97-98.
34. SWEET, supra note 23, at 285.
35. Id. at 354.
36. Id. at 381.
37. Id. at 448-58. The contract price can be amended through a device known as a change
order. B141, supra note 27, 2.6.13; A201, supra note 28, 1 7.3.1, 7.2.1, 7.4.1.
38. MAHER, supra note 3, at 299-300. See also SWEET, supra note 23, at 354. The architect
acts as the "eyes and ears" of the owner on the jobsite. Id.
39. SWEET,supra note 23, at 355.
40. Construction management is similar to the traditional delivery system in that an architect
is retained for the preparation of plans and specifications and a contractor is chosen for construction
of the project. However, the owner also enters into a third contract with a construction manager
who basically takes over the architect's site supervision duties once construction has commenced.
SWEET, supra note 23, at 363-64; SOL A. WARD & THORNDIKE LITCHFIELD, COST CONTROL IN
DESION AND CONSTRUCTION 119-32 (1980).
41. Turnkey is a process whereby a client with a need for a building retains a design/build firm,
and the design/build firm furnishes all services necessary to design and build the structure, such that
when the project is returned to the client, the client has a completed building-all the client must do
is "turn the key" to occupy the structure. WARD & LITCHFIELD, supra note 40, at 2.
42. Design/build is a project delivery method in which the design function and the construction
function, normally held by an architect and contractor respectively, are merged into one firm which
performs both functions or contracts with others to perform both functions. SWEET, supra note 23,
at 356-71; WARD & LITCHFIELD, supra note 40, at 1-13. See also infra APPENDIX B. As a
consequence, the process of competitive bidding among contractors goes away. WARD &
LITCHFIELD, supra note 40, at 2.
43. SWEET, supra note 23, at 356.
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contractor.' Privity is maintained solely with a design/build firm which either
has design and construction services on staff or engages in its own contracts
with an architect and contractor.45 An advantage to the owner of this modem
Because there is no
variation is that the project can be completed faster.'
competitive bidding process, the design/build firm can engage in fast-tracking,
in which the project is begun even before the plans and specifications are
completed. 47 The disadvantages to the owner of the modem variations include
a higher project price, 4 as well as no ability on the part of the owner to sue
the architect, in some jurisdictions, for economic loss because of the lack of
privity.49
Typically, an owner will consider the advantages and disadvantages of the
different types of delivery systems before selecting the one which is best suited
As a large corporation, Pharmatech, the owner in the
for its needs.'
introductory hypothetical scenario, would have considered its need to move
quickly into new headquarters, in which case design/build would be the
appropriate option, against the cost benefits of the traditional delivery system.
The fact that Pharmatech chose to engage in the traditional delivery system after
considering these advantages and disadvantages is significant with respect to how
disputes should be handled among the parties in the future.5 Also significant
in the resolution of such disputes is how courts have applied the law regarding
economic loss in other commercial contexts.

44. WILLIAM D.

BOOTH, MARKETING STRATEGIES FOR DESIGN-BUILD CONTRACTING

1-10

(1995). See also infra APPENDIX B.
45. SWEET, supra note 23, at 367.
46. Id. at 356-57; WARD & LITCHFIELD, supra note 40, at 1-13.
47. "Fast-tracking" is a method of design/build in which construction begins on each phase of
the building as component architectural plans and specifications are completed and approved. John
Martin Co. v. Morse/Diesel, Inc., 819 S.W.2d 428, 429 (Tenn. 1991). See also SwEET, supra note
23, at 356-57.
48. In construction management, this higher project price is mainly due to the additional
contract the owner has with the construction manager who supervises the construction. In
design/build, this higher project price is due to the lack of competitive bidding. See MAHER, supra
note 3, at 302-04; CLOUGH, supra note 7, at 9.
49. SwEET, supra note 23, at 356-71. But see Keel V. Titan Constr. Corp., 639 P.2d 1228
(Okla. 1981). In Keel, the owner in the design/build scenario was allowed to bring an action against
the architect, both on a theory of third party beneficiary as well as a negligence action for economic
losses sustained as a result of defective design. Id. at 1231, 1232.
50. An exception to this rule is in the case of a public owner, such as a governmental entity,
which must follow statutory procedure, normally mandating the traditional delivery system. SWEET,
supra note 23, at 363-71.
51. See infra part V.
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B. HistoricalDevelopment of Legal Theory Regarding Economic Loss
Courts have decided construction dispute cases such as the hypothetical
scenario described in the Introduction by looking to the law of products
liability. 2 In the field of products liability at common law, privity was
necessary in order to recover in tort.53 Courts devised this concept because
they thought that no duty to protect the purchaser existed unless the seller
warranted the product purchased. 4 Courts later abandoned the requirement of
Courts
privity55 in cases of personal injurym and property damage.57
therefore drew a distinction between interests in torts and those in contract. 59
In the former, the seller was held strictly liable.' In the latter, the seller could
only be liable if in privity with the ultimate purchaser. 61 From this
development grew a defense to strict liability actions called the economic loss

52. "[Tlhere is no visible reason for any distinction between the liability of one who supplies
... " WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK.OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 85, at 517 (2d ed. 1955). See also note 179 and accompanying text.
53. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Ex. 1842). In Winterbottom, an injured
coachman was denied recovery against the supplier of a defective wheel. Id. at 406. The case is
commonly known as the genesis of the requirement of privity as the sine qua non of duty in
negligence cases. See Williams & Sons Erectors v. South Carolina Steel Corp., 983 F.2d 1176,
1181 (2d Cir. 1993).
54. Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405.
55. The swiftness with which the requirement of privity was abandoned in the early part of the
twentieth century led Justice Cardozo to remark "[t]he assault upon the citadel of privity is
proceeding in these days apace." Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (N.Y. 1931).
56. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916); William L. Prosser, The
Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 793 (1966).
57. "There is no sensible reason for distinguishing between the two kinds of damage." William
L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1143 (1960). The defense of
"privity" is not permitted in suits for personal injury, whether founded upon a claim of negligence
or upon a claim of strict liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965).
58. Tort:
A legal wrong committed upon the person or property independent of contract. It may
be either (1) a direct invasion of some legal right of the individual; (2) the infraction of
some public duty by which special damage accrues to the individual; or (3) the violation
of some private obligation by which like damage accrues to the individual.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1489 (6th ed. 1990).
59. Contract: "[A] promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a
remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981). Its essentials are competent parties, subject matter, a legal
consideration, mutuality of agreement, and mutuality of obligation. Lamoureux v. Burrillville
Racing Ass'n, 161 A.2d 213, 215 (R.I. 1960).
60. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053; Quatman, supra note 6, at 565.
61. David Hilton Wise, Economic Loss Rule, CONSTRUCTION BRIEFINGS, June 1995, at 1, 3-4.

a chattel and one who erects a structure. .
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losses suffered by the purchaser were solely economic in
to personal injury or property damage,' privity of contract
order to recover." No cause of action existed for pure
tort.' Today, some courts that have adopted the economic

loss doctrine hold that privity of contract is necessary to maintain an action in
tort. '
Most jurisdictions, however, simply hold that, in cases of pure
economic loss, the contract will define the remedy.6' If no privity exists, no

recovery for economic loss will lie.
Agreement that the economic loss doctrine should bar tort recovery in
products liability cases is by no means universal, however. Two cases, decided
in the same year by different state courts, reflect these opposing views. In
Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc.," the New Jersey Supreme Court
extended tort liability beyond personal injury and property damage to include
economic losses.' This view was rejected by the California Supreme Court
in Seely v. White Motor Co.,' which held that only where a contract or

62. Referred to as the Moorman rule in Illinois. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co.,
435 N.E.2d 443 (11I.1982); see generally Mark C. Friedlander, The Impact of Moorman and its
Progeny on Construction Litigation, 77 ILL. B.J. 654 (1989). See also CUSHMAN & HEDEMANN,
supra note 7, at 148-49.
63. Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244, 1245
(Fla. 1993). The economic loss rule prohibits tort recovery when a product damages itself, causing
economic loss, but does not cause personal injury or damage to any other property other than itself.
Id.
64. Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 453.
65. Id.
66. Ward v. Ernst & Young, 435 S.E.2d 628, 634 (Va. 1993). See also Gilliland v. Elmwood
Properties, 391 S.E.2d 577, 580 (S.C. 1990). For a synopsis of Gilliland, see infra note 82 and
accompanying text.
67. Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 453.
68. 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965).
69. Id. at 312. In Santor, the plaintiff brought an action alleging breach of implied warranty
of merchantability. Id. at 307. The carpeting which the plaintiff had ordered from the defendant's
dealer began to unravel soon after being installed. Id. The carpeting was marketed as Grade #1 by
the manufacturer. Id. The court allowed recovery by the plaintiff from the manufacturer, even
though the plaintiff had no privity with that manufacturer, only the dealer. Id. at 314. See also
infra note 211.
70. 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965). In Seely, a truck driver sued the truck manufacturer, with
whom he had no privity, for economic losses resulting from an accident caused by the defective
brakes of the truck. Id. at 147. The court allowed the suit because of an express warranty by the
manufacturer to the plaintiff. Id. at 148. The express warranty to the plaintiff read: "The White
Motor Company hereby warrants each new motor vehicle sold by it to be free from defects in
material and workmanship under normal use and service, its obligation under the warranty being
limited to making good at its factory any part or parts thereof. . . ." Id. Although a cause of
action for breach of warranty was allowed in that case despite lack of privity, damages in tort were
denied. Id. The court in Seely also attempted to distinguish the facts of its case from Santor v.
Karagheusian,Inc. Id. at 151. Had the carpet in Santorbeen sold "as is" instead of "Grade #1,"
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express warranty existed between the parties would economic losses be
recoverable. 71 The United States Supreme Court endorsed Judge Roger
Traynor's opinion in Seely with regard to admiralty jurisdiction when it reasoned
that if liability was opened to a potentially indeterminate class of third parties
for diminished commercial expectations, "contract law would drown in a sea of
tort."'
The Supreme Court's ruling notwithstanding, the economic loss
doctrine is still the minority view. The cases where tort recovery is allowed in
the majority of jurisdictions for pure economic loss include professional liability
claims in the construction context. 73
C. Application of Legal Theory to the Construction Industry
Under its contract with an owner, an architect is held to a professional
standard of care in completing the contract documents and observing the

the court in Seely posited that no basis of recovery would have existed. Id.
71. Id. at 148.
72. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986) (citation
omitted). For examples of how courts have placed limits upon the number of potential third party
claimants against design professionals, see Local Joint Executive Bd. of Las Vegas v. Stern, 651
P.2d 637 (Nev. 1982); Craig v. Everett M. Brooks Co., 222 N.E.2d 752 (Mass. 1967). In Las
Vegas, employees of a hotel that burned down sued the architects of the hotel to recover lost wages
and benefits as a result of the fire. Las Vegas, 651 P.2d at 637-38. The court denied recovery
against the architect on theories of negligence and strict liability because of the lack of privity. Id.
at 638.
In Craig, a contractor was allowed to sue a consulting engineer with whom it had no privity
for negligence. Craig, 222 N.E.2d at 755. The engineer, pursuant to its contract with the
developer, staked out areas on the property so that the contractor would have guideposts in
constructing a road on the property. Id. at 753. The stakes were placed in incorrect locations,
necessitating the rebuilding of the road on another portion of the site. Id. The court stated that
because the user of the information was known to the engineer at the time he supplied it, liability
would not be unlimited. Id. at 754-55. See also William L. Prosser, Misrepresentationand Third
Persons, 19 VAND. L. REv. 231, 248-50 (1966).
73. These include claims of malpractice against accountants, health care professionals,
attorneys, and design professionals. In the absence of privity of contract between two disputing
parties, the general rule is that "there is no general duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid
intangible economic loss or losses to others that do not arise from tangible physical harm to persons
and tangible things." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTs § 92,
at 657 (5th ed. 1984). See generally Chemtrol Adhesives, Inc., v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co.,
537 N.E.2d 624 (Ohio 1989); Nebraska Innkeepers, Inc. v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Corp., 345
N.W.2d 124 (Iowa 1984); Local Joint Executive Bd. of Las Vegas v. Stem, 651 P.2d 637 (Nev.
1982). However, this view is not held by many courts when architects are involved. See, e.g.,
Milton J. Womack, Inc. v. State House of Representatives, 509 So. 2d 62 (La. Ct. App. 1987);
Owen v. Dodd, 431 F. Supp. 1239 (N.D. Miss. 1977); Mayer of Columbus v. Clark-Dietz &
Assocs.-Eng'rs, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Miss. 1982); Davidson & Jones, Inc. v. County of
New Hanover, 255 S.E.2d 580 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979); Berkel & Co. Contractors v. Providence
Hosp., 454 So. 2d 496 (Ala. 1984). Thus, allowing claims against architects by third parties for
economic loss is an anomaly with respect to claims against other types of professionals. See infra
Part V.
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construction of the project.74 This standard, made explicit in the ownerarchitect agreement, 75 is a tort standard. 76 The architect contracts to use that
degree of skill and care that a reasonably prudent architect would use under the
same or similar circumstances.'
When an architect breaches this standard of
care and personal injury or property damage results, courts readily find
liability. 8 When plaintiffs suffer solely economic loss because of a breach of
this standard, the owner usually sues the architect, whose remedy for such loss
is provided for by the owner-architect agreement. 79 In some cases, though, a
contractor suffers economic losses because of the architect's negligence.'
How far courts should go in imposing liability on the architect for damages
caused to a contractor is a matter of difficulty because the contractor and the
architect are not in privity with one another in the traditional delivery system."1
In the introductory hypothetical scenario, assuming Archiwerks breached
its standard of care in drafting the specifications for "approved equals" without
specifying the tests which Capital would have to perform, most courts would
hold Archiwerks liable for Capital's economic loss. But, because of the lack of
privity between Archiwerks and Capital, a small number of states following the
economic loss doctrine would bar recovery of Capital's loss, even if Archiwerks

74. Quatman, supra note 6, at 567.
75. B141, supra note 27, 1 1.1.2.
76. See infra notes 220-28 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of an architect's duty).
77. See American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. Pavia-Byrne Eng'g Corp., 393 So. 2d 830, 838 (La.
Ct. App. 1981) (holding that "the duty owed by those practicing learned professions to their clients,
patients or retainers, is that of exercising that degree of professional care and skill customarily
employed by others in the same profession in the same general area.").
78. Quatman, supra note 6, at 567.
79. B141, supra note 27, at Art. 7.
80. Quatman, supra note 6, at 567. This note is concerned solely with negligence on the part
of the architect, not with intentional torts.
81. Two commentatora describe the contrast between ignoring the contract provisions altogether
and giving them controlling effect. Compare Keith L. Davidson, The Liability ofArchitects, TRIAL,
June 1977, at 20, 22-23 and Bibb Allen, LiabilitiesofArchitects and Engineers to Third Parties,22
ARK. L. REV. 454 (1968) (surveying personal injury and property damage liability for architects
arising from the preparation of plans and specifications as well as from construction supervision).
Some propose an application of various factors, including the applicable contract provisions. JAMES
ACRET, ARCHITECTS AND ENGINEERS: THEIR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILUTIES §§ 10.2, 10.3
(1977); Anthony F. Earley, Note, Liability of Architects and Engineers to Third Parties: A New
Approach, 53 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 306 (1977) (favoring a balancing approach of factors relating
to the protection and expectations of parties involved to determine whether a duty in tort should
exist). In Architectural Malpractice, supra note 7, at 1084-86, the cause of action for negligence
is advocated in two situations: (1) where the architect breaches the duty of care imposed upon him
in his performance of a provision contained in the architect's contract with the owner, when it is
reasonably foreseeable that the contractor would rely upon that undertaking by the architect; and (2)
where the architect, by its conduct, assumes a responsibility, wherein it is reasonably foreseeable
that the contractor would rely upon the non-negligent performance of that undertaking by the
architect. Id.
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had breached its standard of care.
III.
A.

ECONOMIC

Loss

DOCTRINE

Various Conceptions of the Economic Loss Doctrine

The jurisdictions which recognize the economic loss doctrine as a defense
to third party actions can be divided into three groups. The first conception
states that the only way to recover in tort for economic losses is if privity of
contract is present.A This formulation has been the most criticized in that it
contradicts the very reason for contracting in the first place, which is to define
the limits of liability upon breach.'3 If a party is able to recover in tort what
that party was unable to negotiate at the bargaining table, the terms of the
contract become meaningless.U The second, championed most notably by
Illinois courts, states that all economic losses are to be defined by contract.8 5
No cause of action, therefore, exists in tort for economic losses.
The third conception begins with the notion that privity is neither an
element of the economic loss doctrine

nor an exception to its enforcement.8

7

82. Ward v. Ernst & Young, 435 S.E.2d 628, 634 (Va. 1993). See also Gilliland v. Elmwood
Properties, 391 S.E.2d 577 (S.C. 1990). In Gilliland, an owner was allowed to sue an architect
both for breach of contract and tort for recovery of economic losses. Id. at 580. The architect had
allegedly made representations about its ability to design a project that would fit within the client's
budgetary constraints as well as qualify the project for certain governmental approval and tax exempt
bond funding. Id. at 578-79. These representations induced the client to enter into a contract with
the architect. Id. at 579. The project later failed. Id. The court held that the architect owed a duty
in tort independent of that in contract. Id. at 580. The court reasoned that the common law
requirements of a negligence action had been met where misrepresented facts induced the owner to
enter a contract. Id.
83. Danforth v. Acorn Structures, Inc., 608 A.2d 1194, 1200 (Del. 1992); Miller v. United
States Steel Corp., 902 F.2d 573, 574-75 (7th Cir. 1990).
84. Wise, supra note 61, at 3.
85. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 453 (I. 1982). See also
Steven B. Lesser, Economic Loss Doctrine and Its Impact upon Construction Claims,
CONSTRUCTION LAW., Aug. 1994, at 21; Timothy J. Muldowney, Architects, Engineers and
Construction Litigation, 60 DEF. COUNS. J. 356 (1993); Mary Yuen, Note, Absent Privity of
Contract, ContractorsMay Not Recover Economic Damages Caused By an Architect's Negligence,
60 U. CIN. L. REv. 565 (1991); Michael D. Tarullo, The Good, the Bad, and Economic Loss
Liability of a Design Professional, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Apr. 1991, at 10.
86. Miller, 902 F.2d at 575. In Miller, the economic loss doctrine was applied to deny
recovery of economic losses in tort. Id. The plaintiff had relied on oral representations of the
defendant that Cor-Ten steel would be appropriate on his own building. Id. at 574. These
representations proved incorrect and the plaintiff had to incur significant expense in rectifying the
situation. Id. The court stated that tort law was a "superfluous and inapt tool for resolving purely
commercial disputes." Id. This theory was not appropriate because the plaintiff could have asked
the defendant for an express warranty, but did not. Id. at 575. He should therefore "not be
permitted to opt out of commercial law by refusing to avail himself of the opportunities which that
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Thus, instead of a contract analysis, courts should use a tort analysis in
determining whether or not a duty exists to protect third parties from economic
loss." The nonexistence of a duty results in the application of the economic
loss doctrine as a per se rule to bar recovery. The existence of a duty results
in tort liability under negligence or negligent misrepresentation. The states
employing this analysis have used different formulations to determine whether
such harm to the contractor is foreseeable to the architect in order to impute a
duty. 9 In Florida, the emphasis seems to be on the degree of control the
negligent architect has over the work of the contractor.' In New York, the
relationship between the negligent architect and the contractor must be one so
close as to "approach" privity.9
1. Privity Necessary to Sustain a Cause of Action in Tort
Virginia and South Carolina courts have held that privity of contract is an
essential element of a duty in tort. 92 This requirement is necessary because the
standard of quality to which the parties aspire must be defined by that which the
parties have agreed upon.'
On its face, this notion seems logical. If no
privity exists, plaintiffs cannot recover economic loss damages. However, a
closer examination reveals the weakness of this conception of the economic loss
doctrine. Conceivably, courts would allow a party that suffers economic loss
caused by another with whom that party is in privity to sue for the loss not only
in contract, but also in tort.' This fact is significant because the measure of

law gives him." Id.
87. Danforth, 608 A.2d at 1200-01.
88. Id. at 1200.
89. See infra notes 220-28 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of an architect's duty).
See also Lutz Eng'g Co. v. Industrial Louvers, Inc., 585 A.2d 631 (R.I. 1991), in which a
subcontractor was prevented from suing an architect for negligence in approving shop drawings for
a number of louvered panels in an industrial building. Id. at 635. The original specifications did
not mention air-leakage requirements for the louvers, merely that they be similar to a brand named
in the specs or an "approved equal." Id. at 633-34. The shop drawings were rejected once for
failure to conform to this condition, but were approved later without change. Id. at 634. The
installed louvers began to leak when rain was pushed into the building by wind. Id. The contractor
held the sub responsible for bringing the louvers into conformance with the air-leakage requirements,
and the sub sued the architect to recoup its loss. Id. The court held that the architect owed no duty
to the sub and was thus not liable to the sub for negligence. Id. at 635. See also infra note 233 and
accompanying text.
90. A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397, 401 (Fla. 1973).
91. Ultramares v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 446 (N.Y. 1931).
92. See, e.g., Bryant Elec. Co. v. City of Fredericksburg, 762 F.2d 1192, 1195 (4th Cir.
1985); Ward v. Ernst & Young, 435 S.E.2d 628, 634 (Va. 1993); Gilliland v. Elmwood Properties,
391 S.E.2d 577, 580 (S.C. 1990). See also supra note 82 and accompanying text.
93. Ward, 435 S.E.2d at 631; Blake Constr. Co. v. Alley, 353 S.E.2d 724, 726 (Va. 1987);
Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Mo. 1978).
94. Wise, supra note 61, at 3.
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tort recovery is normally more liberal than that in contract. 95 Instead of
confining recovery to those damages agreed upon under the contract, plaintiffs
could ignore the contract, and the court would allow a tort suit.' This position
is antithetical to the notion that a contract is a means by which a party can limit
its liability to another in the event of a breach. 9 Because of its contradictory
nature, this version of the economic loss doctrine is not widely accepted.'
2. All Recoverable Damages Defined by Contract
In this conception, like the one espoused in Virginia and South Carolina,
economic losses are thought of as mere deterioration or loss of the bargain.'
The quality standards to which the building and contract documents are held by
the parties must be in reference to what was agreed upon in contract.'0o Duty
is therefore imputed solely by contract.10 1 But, under this conception, unlike
Virginia and South Carolina, recovery of economic loss when privity is present
is confined to that measure of damages defined in the contract. "°e A-cause of
action in tort is thus disallowed for economic loss, privity or not.
Although its genesis lay in California, 3 this conception of the economic
loss doctrine has developed most notably in Illinois to include the construction
context. The first case to adopt the Seely rationale in Illinois was Moorman
Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co. 4 This decision made clear the

95. This fact is especially true when one considers that in some owner-contractor agreements,
a no-damage-for-delay clause is present. See infra notes 117, 123 and accompanying text.
96. It should be noted, however, that such recovery has been denied in the past in Virginia.
See Senaenbrennerv. Rust, Orling & Neale, Architects, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 55, 58 (Va. 1988).
97. Wise, supra note 61, at 3.
98. Virginia and South Carolina were the only states that could be found with such a rule.
99. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 450 (11. 1982).
100. Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d 324, 327 (Il. 1982) (citation omitted).
101. Id. at 326.
102. See, e.g., Matthew S. Steffey, Negligence, Contract, and Architects' Liability for
Economic Loss, 82 KY. L.J. 659 (1994) (positing that contractors should not be able to sue architects
in tort because they have a contract remedy with the owner). Cf. Jeff Sobel, Comment, Architect
Tort Liability in Preparationof Plansand Specifications, 55 CAL. L. REV. 1361 (1967) (arguing that
tort law should be extended in order to hold architects strictly liable for the economic losses of
contractors).
103. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text (discussing Seely v. White Motor Co., 403
P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965)).
104. 435 N.E.2d 443 (Il1. 1982). In Moorman, a plaintiff who suffered damages when a bolted
steel grain storage tank he purchased from defendant developed a crack could not recover in tort.
Id. at 453. The only damages recoverable were those in contract. Id. at 450. Allowing a cause
of action in that case would have undermined state law:
[T]he law of sales has been carefully articulated to govern the economic relations
between suppliers and consumers of goods.... These rules determine the quality of the
product the manufacturer promises and thereby determine the quality he must deliver.
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fundamental difference between tort and contract, the latter being the only
method by which to recover economic losses. 05 The Moorman rule, as it
became known, was later applied to a subsequent purchaser of a home in
Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf. o The court denied recovery of economic loss by
the remote purchaser from the builder under a tort theory.' 0 7 Other
contractual remedies were available which would define the builder's
liability. 10s
After Moorman and Redarowicz, a dispute arose among Illinois circuits
about how to apply the Moorman rule to architects,"° because Moorman
would have allowed recovery in product liability cases where negligent
misrepresentation was proved. "o The Illinois Supreme Court put this issue to
rest when it decided 2314 Lincoln Park West CondominiumAss'n v. Mann, Gin,
Ebel & Frazier,Ltd."' The court rejected the argument that liability should
lie based on the fact that Moorman made an exception for negligent
misrepresentation because the information provided in the contract documents
was merely incidental." 2 The end and aim of the transaction was the physical
building itself, and buildings are not information within the meaning of the
Restatement.'
The court also rejected the argument that the application of
Moorman to the professional context would upset established principles of

...Thus, adopting strict liability in tort for economic loss would effectively eviscerate
section 2-316 of the UCC.
Id. at 447. The court also felt that allowing such recovery would have blurred the line between
contract and tort law:
[Denying tort recovery for economic losses] comports with the notion that the essence
of a product liability tort case is not that the plaintiff failed to receive the quality of the
product he expected, but that the plaintiff has been exposed, through a hazardous
product, to an unreasonable risk of injury to his person or property. On the other hand,
contract law, which protects expectation interests, provides the proper standard when
a qualitative defect is involved, i.e., when a product is unfit for its intended use.
Id. at 448.
105. Id. at 453.
106. 441 N.E.2d 324 (I11.1982). In Redarowzcz, the court extended the Moorman rule and
denied recovery of economic losses of a subsequent purchaser against a builder. Id. at 331.
107. Id. at 327.
108. Id. at 331.
109. Compare Rosos Litho Supply Corp. v. Hansen, 462 N.E.2d 566 (I11.App. Ct. 1984)
(allowing recovery against architect), with Fence Rail Dev. Corp. v. Nelson & Assocs., 528 N.E.2d
344 (II1. App. Ct. 1984) (denying recovery).
110. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 452 (I11.1982).
111. 555 N.E.2d 346 (I11.1990). In 2314 Lincoln Park W., the court applied the Moorman rule
to architects. Id. at 353. Condo owners (who had no privity with the architect) could not recover
economic loss from an architect. Id. The court felt that the owners could have their commercial
expectations met through their contract with the developer: "Contracting parties are free to bargain
over the terms of their warranties." Id. at 348 (citing Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 447-48).
112. Id. at 351 (citation omitted).
113. Id.
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liability for malpractice in other professions," 4 simply because no duty
existed even under negligence theory to protect the commercial expectations of
third parties." 5 Thus, duty in negligence does not exist in this conception of
the rule.
The rationale for the rule limiting economic loss to contract recovery is that
the owner, who has a contract with the contractor, is better equipped to assess
the risks of doing business together on a project than an architect who has no
such contract with the contractor." 6 The owner and contractor can decide on
many different ways in which to handle claims for economic loss." 7 The
owner's insurer can, therefore, adequately gauge the risks involved by looking
at the contract between the parties and affixing the owner's premiums
accordingly. "' Conversely, insurers of architects have no such luxury." 9

114. Id. at 353.
115. Id. at 351-53. See also FloorCraftFloor Covering, Inc. v. Parma Community Gen. Hosp.
Ass'n, 560 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio 1990), in which the plaintiff, a flooring subcontractor, installed vinyl
flooring for the owner, a hospital, in a manner prescribed by instructions in the plans and
specifications prepared by the defendant architect. Id. at 206-07. After installation, bubbles began
to appear and the plaintiff had to replace the flooring at a significant cost. Id. The allegation was
that the architect negligently specified the flooring and sealant which caused the plaintiffs damages.
Id. Recovery was denied on the theory that such recovery for economic losses is strictly a subject
for contract negotiation and assignment. Id. at 212.
116. The economic loss rule was developed to prevent disproportionate liability and allow
parties to allocate risk by contract. Michael D. Lieder, Constructing a New Action for Negligent
Infliction of Economic Loss: Building on Cardozo and Coase, 66 WASH. L. RExv. 937, 940-41
(1991). See also FloorCraft Floor Covering, 560 N.E.2d at 211. The court stated, in relevant part:
The controlling policy consideration underlying tort law is the safety of persons and
property-the protection of persons and property from losses resulting from injury. The
controlling policy consideration underlying the law of contracts is the protection of
expectations bargained for. If that distinction is kept in mind, the damages claimed in
a particular case may more readily be classified between claims for injuries to persons
or property on the one hand and economic losses on the other.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
117. These methods include a "no-damage-for-delay" clause for breach. See infra note 123 and
accompanying text.
118. Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 881 P.2d 986 (Wash. 1994).
In Berschauer, a contractor was denied recovery against an architect with whom it had no privity.
Id. at 993. The court felt that it "must exercise caution ... that [it does] not unduly upset the law
upon which expectations are built and business is conducted." Id. at 991. The court also felt that:
If tort and contract remedies were allowed to overlap, certainty and predictability in
allocating risk would decrease and impede future business activity. The construction
industry in particular would suffer, for it is in this industry that we see most clearly the
importance of the precise allocation of risk as secured by contract. The fees charged
by architects, engineers, contractors, developers, vendors, and so on are founded on
their expected liability exposure as bargained and provided for in the contract.
Id. at 992. In light of these concerns, the court held that contract principles should override tort
principles and prevent third parties from suing in tort for economic losses. Id. at 993.
119. See Lieder, supra note 116, at 940.
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Without a contract telling insurers the limit of the architect's liability, a
considerable ambiguity exists."2° In order to protect itself from the ill effects
of such an ambiguity, insurers would have to charge architects exorbitant
amounts in premiums. 2' As a result, many architects would be forced out of
Thus, the very
business, or at least out of the traditional delivery system."
system many owners would like to choose because of its unique advantages
would no longer be a viable option to them.
Another rationale for restricting recovery of economic loss of contractors
to those defined by their contracts with the owners focuses on the contractors'
motivations for suing an architect for such losses in the first place. Many times
the contract between the owner and architect contains a "no-damages-for-delay"
clause.2" Recovery for the contractor of economic loss under the contract
In order to avoid this result, the contractor
would therefore be barred."
would seek to sue the architect in tort."12 The rationale behind many courts'
rejection of the Virginia model is appropriate here because a contractor should
not be able to recover in tort that which it failed to bargain for in contract.

120. Id. See also Wise, supra note 61, at 4; Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n v. Charley
Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244, 1247 (Fla. 1993).
121. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1247.
122. See also Wise, supra note 61, at 4.
123. Steffey, supra note 102, at 702. See also Williams & Sons Erectors, Inc. v. South
Carolina Steel Corp., 983 F.2d 1176 (2d Cir. 1993). In Williams, the contractor sued the architect
for negligent misrepresentation of plans and specifications which caused delay. Id. at 1179-80. The
contractor, pursuant to its contract with the owner, had a "no-damages-for-delay" clause, providing:
No claims for increased costs, charges, expenses or damages of any kind shall be made
by the Contractor against the Owner for any delays or hindrances from any cause
whatsoever; provided that the Owner, in the Owner's discretion, may compensate the
Contractor for any said delays by extending the time for completion of the work as
specified in the Contract.
Id. Thus, the contractor was given additional time to complete the project such that the contractor
would not be in breach by completing the project later than the date contracted for, but the contract
would not compensate the contractor monetarily for the delay. The contractor thus sued the architect
in tort to be compensated. The court denied recovery because the relationship between the architect
and the contractor did not "approach privity." Id. at 1182. The pre-bid meeting, at which the
architect answered questions from prospective bidders including the plaintiff, was not enough to
establish the required relationship. Id. at 1183.
See also Floor Craft Floor Covering, Inc. v. Parma Community Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 560
N.E.2d 206, 212 (Ohio 1990). The contractor may try to avoid a "no-damages-for-delay" clause in
its contract with the owner by suing the architect in tort, thereby avoiding the contract terms in order
to recover economic losses. Id. See also A201, supra note 28, 1i 2.3.5, 2.3.16.
124. Floor Craft, 560 N.E.2d at 212.
125. Id.
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3. All Recoverable Damages Defined by a Duty in Tort
In this conception, the court engages in a preliminary analysis to determine
on a case-by-case basis whether or not to impute a duty on the part of an
architect to protect third parties from economic loss."2 For instance, Florida
has denied recovery even when foreseeability existed.' 27 Whether a duty will
be imputed in that state depends upon whether the court thinks that, as a matter
of policy, the public as a whole should bear the brunt of the economic loss
sustained by those who neglect to contract for such losses in the first place.'28
The economic loss doctrine has been enforced as a per se rule to deny recovery
when other statutory and common law remedies are available to the
plaintiff,": and when the supervising architect has no direct control over the

126. See, e.g., Wisconsin law, which adheres to the view that facts and circumstances will
determine whether a duty will be imputed or not. Compare A.E. Inv. Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc.,
214 N.W.2d 764 (Wis. 1974) (finding liability), with Vonasek v. Hirsch & Stevens, Inc., 221
N.W.2d 815 (Wis. 1974) (denying liability).
127. City of Tampa v. Thornton-Tomasetti, 646 So. 2d 279, 282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
128. Sandarac Ass'n, Inc. v. W.R. Frizzell Architects, Inc., 609 So. 2d 1349, 1353 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1992). In Sandarac, a condominium association could not recover from an architect
economic losses sustained through allegedly negligent preparation of plans and specifications because
no privity existed. Id. at 1352. "Historically, the judiciary has limited the protected interests in
negligence to interests concerning the safety of one's person and property.... [These interests are
ones that people usually have no opportunity to protect in private contracts." Id. at 1352-53.
See also Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244
(Fla. 1993). In Casa Clara, a homeowner could not recover from a concrete supplier with whom
it had no privity for purely economic losses. Id. at 1246. "The basic function of tort law is to shift
the burden of loss from the injured plaintiff to one who is at fault . . . or to one who is better able
to bear the loss and prevent its occurrence." Id. (citation omitted). For a discussion of the impact
of Casa Clara on Florida law, see Robert Alfert, Jr., Architects' Relief Act of 1993: The Legacy
of Casa Clara Condominium Association, Inc. v. Charley Toppino & Sons, 69 FLA. B.J. 36 (1995).
For another argument of public policy favoring the application of the economic loss doctrine consult
Sidney R. Barret, Jr., A CriticalAnalysis, 40 S.C. L. REV. 891,933 (1989) (arguing that when only
economic harm is involved, the question becomes "whether the consuming public as a whole should
bear the cost of economic losses sustained by those who failed to bargain for adequate contract
remedies.").
See also City of Tampa v. Thornton-Tomasetti, P.C., 646 So. 2d 279 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994). In Tampa, an owner could not sue an engineer who was a subcontractor of the architect.
Id. at 283. The court reasoned: "To expose a consultant not in privity with the owner to the same
liability as the professional in privity would diminish the willingness of persons or entities not a part
of the central bargain to provide services at the risk of having vicariously to participate in
unanticipated losses." Id.
129. Sandarac, 609 So. 2d at 1352. In Sandarac, several reasons were advanced for the
endorsement of the economic loss doctrine: (1) it is largely a restatement of the traditional common
law rule that negligence law is intended primarily to protect interests concerning the safety of one's
person and property; (2) it is a limitation on recovery in negligence when the parties have elected
to an alternative remedy under contract law; and (3) it bars an otherwise viable negligence cause of
action because the damages are only economic. Id. The court stated that:
[Not following the economic loss doctrine] creates a new relationship of duty and a
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work." 3 Mere foreseeability, then, will not always lead to the imputation of
a duty on the part of the architect to protect the commercial expectations of
Similarly, New York has denied recovery when the
contractors.13 '
relationship between the parties has not "approached" privity.' 32 However,
been found in the
this factor is based on foreseeability and has sometimes
33
construction context allowing a cause of action.

corresponding standard of care to protect a purely economic interest in the absence of
bodily injury or property damage .... [The judiciary] should be aware that it is not
merely creating an exception to an existing common law rule of damages. It should be
convinced that the problem justifies a judicial allocation of the relevant risks among the
members of society, and that an adequate remedy cannot realistically exist through
private contracts and statutory remedies.
Id. at 1353. An earlier case, A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973), was thus
limited to situations in which an architect has direct supervision over the plaintiff so that the plaintiff
is a known, intended beneficiary of the architect's contract at the time it is performed. Id. at 1354.
Here, the condominium association could not base its theory of recovery on negligence because:
(1) a common law implied warranty for homeowners was available; (2) statutory warranties were
available; and (3) an express third party beneficiary in the contract was available. Id. at 1352.
Similarly, in Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1247, homeowners were denied recovery in tort
because they had protection other than a tort claim for economic loss, including: (1) statutory
warranties; (2) a warranty of habitability (common law warranty); (3) the duty of sellers to disclose
defects; and (4) the ability of purchasers to inspect houses for defects and bargain over price in light
of those defects. Id.
130. Southland Constr., Inc. v. Richeson Corp., 642 So. 2d 5, 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Q. Spancrete, Inc. v. Ronald E. Frazier & Assocs., P.A., 630 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994). In Spancrete, a subcontractor was prevented from suing the architect for economic losses.
Id. at 1198. Moyer was limited to its facts, because the court in that case made much of the fact
that the architect had the authority to stop the work. Id. Under the A201 that power is vested solely
in the owner. Id. The power to supervise the contractor is expressly denied. Id. The architect
merely retains administrative powers as the agent of the owner (i.e. the power to reject the work).
Id. "Supervising architect" thus did not apply here. Id.
131. Spancree, 630 So. 2d at 1198.
132. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 446 (N.Y. 1931). See also R.H. Macy &
Co. v. Williams Tile & Terrazzo Co., 585 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ga. 1984). In R.H. Macy, the
architect specified ceramic tile, which, after installed, was discovered to be defective. Id. at 175-77.
The supplier, after being sued by the owner (with whom the supplier had a contract), cross-claimed
against the architect for negligence in failing to have the tile tested. Id. at 176. The court held that
there existed no duty on the part of the architect because the relationship did not "approach privity. "
Id. at 180. The architect's determination of the suitability of the tile was based neither on a contract
nor a commitment to the plaintiff, but merely on the plaintiffs assumptions regarding the architect's
responsibilities. Id. at 179.
133. Strategem Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int'l N.V., 153 F.R.D. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). In
Strategem, a construction manager, as a representative of the owner, was allowed to sue the architect
for contribution/indemnity in its defense of a suit against it by the owner for economic losses
because the relationship between them had approached privity. Id. at 548. An owner corporation
had hired a developer to act as its representative in building two office buildings in Manhattan. Id.
at 538. The owner then hired an architect for architectural services. Id. The agreement between
the owner and the architect stated that, with respect to any negligence caused by it, the architect
would indemnify the owner and the owner's representative. Id. The owner became dissatisfied with
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The duty in the tort conception of the economic loss doctrine is consistent
with this Note's proposal. If courts are unwilling to bar recovery based on the
mere lack of privity, they can engage in a duty analysis with the same result.
The contribution of this Note is that, rather than a public policy analysis or one
which determines whether the architect and the third party "approached" privity,
courts should first look to the relationship between architect and contractor as
determined by the owner in deciding whether to adopt a per se rule against
recovery.
If this relationship is an adversarial one, recovery should be
barred. '3'

B. Instances in Which the Economic Loss Doctrine Does Not Apply
One conception of the economic loss doctrine states that, when damages
other than property damage or personal injury are suffered, contract will define
the remedy, if any.135 Thus, only personal injury and property damage are
compensable in tort."3 Plaintiffs in jurisdictions that enforce the economic
loss doctrine, rather than attacking the doctrine directly, often elect to argue that
their losses fit into one or both of the categories of exceptions to the doctrine

its representative and terminated their joint venture, and the representative commenced an action to
recoup funds owed it under the contract. Id. at 538-39. The owner counterclaimed against the
representative, charging it with various tort and contract theories. Id. at 539. The representative
then filed a third party action against the architect for indemnification. Id. at 539-40. The owner's
contention was that the representative failed to adequately supervise the construction project in which
not enough rentable square footage had been provided for in the plans. Id. The representative
contended that the architect resisted its efforts to make necessary changes, and that the architect
made the incorrect calculations. Id. at 540. The architect contended that it had no duty to the
representative, so no recovery could be had in tort. Id. The court held that the architect owed a
duty to the representative because their relationship approached privity. Id. at 548. The court based
its conclusion on the specific facts of the case: (1) the architect and the representative ran weekly
meetings and the architect knew that the representative relied on the architect's figures and used
them in calculations presented to the owner; (2) the owner/architect agreement specified that the
owner's representative was a third party beneficiary; and (3) the relationship approached privity.
Id. For the factors which New York courts look to in order to determine whether a relationship
approaches privity, see Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110, 118
(N.Y. 1985). See also infra note 182 and accompanying text.
Strategem is important from the standpoint that it is consistent with this note's proposal. Even
if third party beneficiary status had not been explicitly conferred upon the owner's representative,
liability would have been found against the architect because the representative and the architect were
meant by the owner to have an amiable relationship as opposed to an adversarial one. See infra part
V.
134. See infra part V.
135. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 453 (Ill.
1982).
136. Id. at 450. See also SwEET, supra note 23, at 284-96.
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which are compensable in tort.17 Courts have developed limitations on what
is compensable under these two exceptions. First, courts have been reluctant to
extend liability to include negligence resulting in merely the threat to personal
safety. I" Second, as to property damage, the defective building must damage
"other property" in order to be compensable.139 When a building merely
"injures

1.

. . . itself," no recovery will lie."4

"Physical Harm"

Justice Roger Traynor, writing for the California Supreme Court in Seely
v. White Motor Co.,4' dealt with the issue of physical harm as being
compensable, and concluded that the only actionable conduct is that which
This language was repeated
creates an unreasonable risk of harm. 42
throughout the country as the rationale behind denying compensation for
economic loss when "unreasonable risks of harm" did not occur.

143

Most

courts began making a distinction between "sudden, calamitous" events which
created an immediate threat to personal safety and those which occured over
time due to "deterioration, internal breakdown, or nonaccidental use. " "
Those in the former category were thought to be compensable because of the

137. Cases in which plaintiffs alleged personal injury (i.e. the "threat" of personal injury) or
property damage include Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So.
2d 1244, 1247 (Fla. 1993), and Sensenbrennerv.Rust, Orling & Neale, Architects, Inc., 374 S.E.2d
55, 57 (Va. 1988).
138. Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151-52 (Cal. 1965).
139. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1247.
140. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 871 (1986).
141. 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965).
142. Id. Justice Traynor stated, in relevant part:
The distinction . . -between tort recovery for physical injuries and warranty recovery
for economic loss ... rests ... on an understanding of the nature of the responsibility
a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products. He can appropriately be
held liable for physical injuries caused by defects by requiring his goods to match a
standard of safety defined in terms of conditions that create unreasonablerisks of harm.
He cannot be held for'the level of performance of his products in the consumer's
business unless he agrees that the product was designed to meet the consumer's
demands. A consumer should not be charged at the will of the manufacturer with
bearing the risk of physical injury when he buys a product on the market. He can,
however, be fairly charged with the risk that the product will not match his economic
expectations unless the manufacturer agrees that it will. Even in actions for negligence,
a manufacturer's liability is limited to damages for physical injuries and there is no
recovery for economic loss alone.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
143. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 448-49 (Ill. 1982).
144. Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248, 251 (Alaska 1977); Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 449;
2314 Lincoln Park W. Condominium Ass'n v. Mann, Gin, Ebel & Frazier, Ltd., 555 N.E.2d 346,
352-53 (111.1990).
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extreme threat to life and limb. 5 Those in the second category were not
compensable in tort because such occurrences were properly covered by contract
law in the form of warranties."
Compensating for such "sudden occurrences" which cause an immediate
threat to personal injury seems logical in light of the concerns expressed by the
Indiana Supreme Court in Barnes v. MacBrown & Co.:
If there is a defect in a stairway and the purchaser repairs the defect
and suffers an economic loss, should he fail to recover because he did
not wait until he or some member of his family fell down the stairs
and broke his neck? Does the law penalize those who are alert and
prevent injury? Should it not put those who prevent personal injury
on the same level as those who fail to anticipate it?' 47
But these concerns did not sway the United States Supreme Court in East River
The Court rejected recovery even
S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval.1
when the defect occurred as a result of a sudden, calamitous event. 4 9 The
court in Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Solis, Inc. "s
145. See Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 575 P.2d 1383, 1385-86 (Or. 1978). In Russell, the court
felt that a distinction should be drawn between disappointed users and endangered users, with only
the latter being able to recover in tort. Id.
See also Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 448. In Moorman, the argument that economic losses
should be compensable because it was only by happy accident that personal injury was prevented
from occurring (i.e. catching the defective condition before causing personal injury) was rejected.
Id. at 449-50. Putting persons at risk should be compensable only if an "extreme threat to life and
limb" occurred. Id. at 449. Thus, to be compensable property damage there must be a "sudden
. . . occurrence." Id. at 450. Economic losses are those which occur over time due to
deterioration, internal breakdown, or nonaccidental cause. Id. These losses are what warranties
were designed to cover Id.
See also 2314 Lincoln Park W., 555 N.E.2d at 352. The existence of a duty is dependent
upon the type of property damage suffered: (1) if it is damaged over time, then no liability attaches;
(2) if it is sudden, then liability attaches. Id. at 352-53. Unlike injuries or property damage to
others in which a duty arises independent of the contract (based on policy considerations, etc.), there
is no duty under negligence or strict liability to prevent a product from injuring itself. Id. at 352.
Such a concern relates to the quality, rather than to the safety of the structure and thus is a matter
better resolved under contract law. Id. at 353. The unit owners received express warranties from
the developer and so they had a potential source of recovery for their losses. Id. at 352.
146. Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 453.
147. 342 N.E.2d 619, 621 (Ind. 1976).
148. 476 U.S. 858, 870 (1986).
149. Id.
150. 620 So. 2d 1244, 1248 (Fla. 1993). In Casa Clara, recovery of economic losses by a
homeowner against a subcontractor was denied. Id. at 1248. The concrete supplied by the sub had
a high salt content which caused the rebar to corrode in the building and forced the homeowners to
replace it. Id. at 1245. Because no person was injured and no other property was damaged, the
homeowners had no cause of action against the defendant in tort. Id. at 1248.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1996

280

Valparaiso University Law
Review, Vol. 31, No.
1 [1996],
Art. 8
UNIVERSITY
LAW
REVIEW
VALPARAISO

[Vol. 31

agreed. The possibility of injury was not enough to sustain a negligence action
because not all four elements of the tort were present; damages was the missing
element.'' Because no damages from personal injury had yet occurred, any
compensation based on the threat of personal injury would be indeterminate and
52
speculative.
The Indiana court's concern about the welfare of those threatened by the
negligence of architects is well founded.'53 But, under modem tort principles,
the only threats which are actionable are those constituting assault, the proof of
which requires a showing of intent.1 Thus far no cause of action exists for
threats of physical harm produced by negligence without actual damages
sustained. 55 Creating such an action would have grave consequences. Under
such a cause of action, theoretically, every driver that passed another driver who
was drunk would have a cause of action against that drunk driver because,
through his negligence, the drunk driver had threatened the safety of the other
drivers. The "drowning" metaphor alluded to by the United States Supreme
Court in East River" is therefore worthy of consideration in this context.
Thus, rather than claiming threat to personal safety, some plaintiffs elect to
plead that their economic losses constitute property damage.5 7
2. "Property Damage"
As previously stated, compensable property damage is that which, through
negligent design, causes damage to other property besides the building itself.' 8
Courts have struggled with the meaning behind phrases like "other
property,""" and that property which does not "injure itself. " " In Casa
Clara Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc.," the plaintiff
argued that what it had actually purchased was not the building itself, but rather,
the building materials with which to build the building. 62 The building was

151. Id.
152. Id. at 1247; Danforth v. Acorn Structures, Inc., 608 A.2d 1194, 1198 (Del. 1992).
153. Other courts have expressed similar concern about the threat to personal safety. See, e.g.,
supra note 145 and accompanying text.
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 331 (1979).
155. See, e.g., supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text. See also Palsgraf v. Long Island
R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) (observing that "negligence in the air . . . will not do."
(internal citations omitted)).
156. 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986). See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d
1244, 1247 (Fla. 1993).
158. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
159. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1247.
160. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 867, 871 (1986).
161. 620 So. 2d 1244, 1247 (Fla. 1993).
162. Id.
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The court rejected this
thus "other" property, compensable in tort."
argument.'" The product purchased by the homeowners was not the materials
for the building, but the building itself.'"
A similar case in Virginia,
Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale, Architects, Inc.,' involved damage
to a house caused by water leaking from an indoor pool. 6" The pool was in
a structure that was separate from the rest of the house.'" The plaintiff's
theory was that because the pool structure was outside the home's foundation,
injury to property could be claimed.'" The plaintiff sought to recover the cost
of repairing damage done to the home caused by the pool as well as the cost of
repairing the pool so that it would cause no further damage to the home." 7
The court held that the plaintiff contracted for a package, including a pool, and
the loss the plaintiff suffered was with part of that package.' 7' Thus, only
economic losses were suffered and no recovery could be had.' 7 Even if the
pool was unattached and located on some other spot on the property, the result
would not change. "
Another contractor-plaintiff attempted to rely on how the court in its
jurisdiction had defined property interests in the past and argued that such a
definition should apply in the economic loss context. 74 Virginia law had
characterized lost profits or loss of value as injuries to property interests for
purposes of determining the applicable statute of limitations. 75 This definition
was rejected when it was used by the plaintiff to describe his losses. 76 A
restrictive view was therefore taken as to actions involving mere threats to
personal safety as well as property damage. Most plaintiffs who suffer
economic loss in jurisdictions which enforce the economic loss doctrine will thus
not be able to plead their cases within the narrow exceptions to the rule.

163. Id.
164. Id.

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
374 S.E.2d 55 (Va. 1988).
Id.at 56.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 57.
Id.at 58.
Sensenbrennerv. Rust, Orling & Neale, Architects, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 55, 58 (Va. 1988).
Id.
Blake Constr. Co. v. Alley, 353 S.E.2d 724, 725-26 (Va. 1987).
Id.at 726 n.3.

176. Id. "[The] cases [interpreting the statute] are not controlling, however, as the
determinations of the nature of the injuries were made inan entirely different context; the cases did
not purport to interpret [the] Code.. .. " Id.
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ACTIONS FOR RECOVERY OF ECONOMIC Loss

Application of the economic loss doctrine is the minority view where the
professional liability of architects to contractors is concerned.'" The doctrine
offers few advantages when applied to the hypothetical scenario described in the
Introduction."t In the words of one state court, "[t]he economic loss rule is
stated with ease but applied with great difficulty." 79 The propensity to allow
actions by contractors against architects arises from several factors. First, the
plans and specifications are to be used by a limited number of users who are
well known as such by the architect."m These users, namely contractors, rely
solely on the plans and specifications in carrying out their contract with the
owner.'' Thus, because the class who could recover in tort is determinate,
concerns about contract "drowning in a sea of tort" seem unfounded. Second,
because the potential users are foreseeable to the architect, the relationship
between the architect and contractor may sometimes be said to "approach

177. Quatman, supra note 6, at 561. "At least five jurisdictions recognize the economic loss
doctrine as a defense to third party claims against design professionals." Id. at 568. These include:
Georgia, Illinois, New York, Ohio, and Virginia. Id. Aside from these states, however, "most
jurisdictions do not distinguish between personal injury or property damage and the risk of economic
loss." Id. at 572. "The majority . . . [of jurisdictions] hol[d] that when the traditional elements of
a negligence or negligent misrepresentation action are satisfied, the design professional may be held
liable for economic losses." Id. See generally Wagner, supra note 11 (discussing the majority
rule).
178. Wise, supra note 61, at 4-5. Advantages of the doctrine include: (1) it offers a bright-line
test to distinguish between the remedies available in contract and the remedies available in tort; (2)
it respects the sanctity of contract to provide for such recovery; and (3) it maintains the adversarial
relationship between architect and contractor. Steffey, supra note 102, at 695.
179. Sandarac Ass'n, Inc. v. W.R. Frizzell Architects, Inc., 609 So. 2d 1349, 1352 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1992). The Illinois Supreme Court has denied recovery of economic losses in the
construction industry by extending the economic loss doctrine of products liability cases. 2314
Lincoln Park W. Condominium Ass'n v. Mann, Gin, Ebel & Frazier, Ltd., 555 N.E.2d 346 (Il1.
1990). However, even Illinois courts have struggled with this transition. See generally Friedlander,
supra note 62; Steven G.M. Stein et al., A Blueprint for the Duties and Liabilities of Design
ProfessionalsAfter Moorman, 60 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 163 (1984) (discussing the conflict in lower
Illinois courts after Moorman). Because this setting includes parties who are known by the architect
at the time the architect begins work on the contract documents, courts have not applied the
economic loss doctrine very readily as in other areas such as admiralty where the parties likely are
not known to each other. Compare Rosos Litho Supply Corp. v. Hansen, 462 N.E.2d 566 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1984) (allowing recovery in the construction context), with East River S.S. Corp v.
Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986) (denying recovery in the admirality context), and
Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MN' Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985) (denying recovery in the
admirality context).
180. A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397, 400 (Fla. 1973).
181. Id. at 401-02.
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privity.""
Third, modem authority is simply in favor of extending rather
than restricting liability."
In the introductory hypothetical scenario, Archiwerks may, in fact, have

been negligent in its preparation of plans and specifications relating to the
stainless steel framing system it specified. For instance, if both the plans and
specifications depicted "stainless steel or approved equal" without specifying the
detailed tests or data that would be required of products falling into the "equal"
category, Capital may not have known what information would be required of
it if it specified "painless" on the shop drawings. Capital would have relied on
the ambiguous specifications and suffered economic loss thereby. If the facts
of the introductory hypothetical scenario were such, forcing Capital to sue
Pharmatech for breach of contract, who in turn would join Archiwerks would

be "an expensive, time consuming and wasteful process, and may be interrupted
by insolvency, lack of jurisdiction, disclaimer, or the statute of limitations. ""' 4
The economic loss doctrine in this context is therefore seen by most courts as
inefficient and unnecessarily cumbersome, such that most would allow Capital
to sue Archiwerks directly.
Liability, then, has been extended to architects to protect the commercial
expectations of contractors. Theories based on contract as well as tort have
been advanced in finding liability. Contract recovery is based on a third party
beneficiary theory.S 5 Theories of tort recovery are based on negligence or

182. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 446 (N.Y. 1931). This theory was further
articulated by criteria set out in CreditAlliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110,
118 (N.Y. 1985): (1) awareness that the reports were to be used for a particular purpose or
purposes; (2) reliance by a known party or parties in furtherance of that purpose; and (3) some
conduct by the defendant linking it to the party or parties and evincing the defendant's understanding
of their reliance. Id. See also supra note 133 and accompanying text.
183. A.R. Moyer, 285 So. 2d at 399. "Privity is a theoretical device of the common law that
recognizes limitations of liability commensurate with compensation for contractual acceptance of
risk. The sharpness of its contours blurs when brought into contact with modem concepts of tort
liability." Id. Modem authority is moving in the direction of measuring tort liability by the scope
of the duty owed, rather than on artificial concepts of privity. 74 AM. JUR. 2D Torts § 52 (1974);
Guardian Constr. Co. v. Tetra Tech Richardson, Inc., 583 A.2d 1378, 1385 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990).
184. Prosser, supra note 57, at 1124. But see infra notes 287-93 and accompanying text
(discussing the value of this procedure on the entire construction industry even though somewhat
cumbersome on individual plaintiffs).
185. Guardian, 583 A.2d at 1386. This theory allows a prime contractor to recover based on
a claim that the contractor was the intended beneficiary of the contract between the architect and
owner. Id. In Guardian, a third party beneficiary theory was held to be inapplicable. Id. at 1387.
The court reiterated the majority rule that the only third parties who have legal rights under a third
party beneficiary theory are donees and creditors of the promisee. Id. at 1386. As between
architects and contractors, contractors are neither creditors nor are they the subject of an architect's
generosity. Id. at 1387. "Using the plans during bid preparation is not tantamount to saying that
the contract giving rise to those plans and specs was intended in any legal sense to benefit [the
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design
negligent misrepresentation'8 6 and are due to negligent supervision,
87
errors or omissions, or negligent approval of shop drawings.
A.

Contract:

Third Party Beneficiary Theory

Contractors have often raised a theory of third party beneficiary upon which
to recover economic losses from architects."i

Under this theory, the party not

in privity claims that it is the intended beneficiary of the contracting parties'
contract. 19 Some courts have been receptive to this approach. For example,
a New York court allowed an owner of a construction project, whose whollyowned subsidiary entered into contracts with an architect and a contractor, to
recover from them for economic loss despite the lack of privity.'" ° The owner
was able to show that it was merely the alter-ego of the subsidiary because the
contract expressly stated that the contract was for its benefit.' 9' A federal
court applying New York law also held that, where the contract expressly stated
that the architect would indemnify the owner or the owner's representative with
respect to any negligence caused by it, the owner's representative could recover
in tort for economic losses."2 Liability is thus determined by the construction

of the contract."u

contractor]." Id.
186. Id. at 1381. These damages are prohibited under the economic loss doctrine. Id. at 1383.
Again, this note is concerned with negligence actions only, not with intentional torts. For such an
analysis, see Quatman, supra note 6, at 588-89.
187. Quatman, supra note 6, at 583-86. Negligence theory is based on: (1) defective design;
(2) project delays; (3) negligent site selection; (4) negligent selection of materials; (5) ambiguous
specifications; (6) failure to act. Id. Negligent misrepresentation theory is based on: (1)supplying
false information on plans or specs; (2) failing to exercise reasonable care. Id.
188. Id. at 563-64. Under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981), third party
beneficiaries are allowed to sue in tort. See also Bernard Johnson, Inc. v. Continental Constructors,
Inc., 630 S.W.2d 365 (rex. Ct. App. 1982). In Johnson, the plaintiff-contractor sued the architect
for economic loss of delays and increased costa after allegedly failing to properly administer and
process change orders for the construction project. Id. at 367. The contractor sued, inter alia, on
a third party beneficiary theory. Id. at 368.
189. Quatman, supra note 6, at 561, 563.
190. Key Int'l. Mfg. Inc. v. Morse/Diesel, Inc., 536 N.Y.S.2d 792, 795-96 (N.Y. App. Div.
1988).
191. Id.
192. Strategem Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int'l. N.V., 153 F.R.D. 535, 548-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
193. A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397, 402 (Fla. 1973). The court stated:
The question whether a contract was intended for the benefit of a third person is
generally regarded as one of construction of the contract. The intention of the parties
in this respect is determined by the terms of the contract as a whole, construed in the
light of the circumstances under which it was made and the apparent purpose that the
parties are trying to accomplish.
Id. (following 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 304 (1964)).
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However, where the contract is silent as to third party beneficiaries or
expressly rejects such status, courts have almost universally denied
recovery."
One court has expressed the opinion that an incidental benefit,
conferred upon contractors by the existence of a contract between architect and
owner, is not enough for third party beneficiary status to be conferred upon the
contractor. 95 In order for such status to be conferred, the contract between
architect and owner must have been made with the intent to confer an actual
benefit on the contractor.'" Therefore, where such intent is not expressly
stated in the contract, most courts have not found third party beneficiary
status.'
Another court has limited those who could recover under a third
party beneficiary theory without express language in the contract to situations
involving creditors of a promisee or donees.'9
This same court, when
applying this test to the traditional delivery system, held that contractors did not
fit within either the creditor or donee exception." 9 Without express language
in the contract between architect and owner, then, contractors could not recover
on a theory of third party beneficiary. Although it is plainly foreseeable to an
architect that a contractor will rely on the plans and specifications, the use by
the contractor is not tantamount to saying that the contract giving rise to those
documents was intended in any legal sense to benefit the contractor.? ° The
agency relationship between architect and owner is another factor disfavoring the
theory that contractors are third party beneficiaries of the contract between
architect and owner."° For all these reasons, contracts which do not expressly
grant third party beneficiary status to the contractor are not likely to succeed.
In the hypothetical scenario described in the Introduction, the architect,
Archiwerks, and owner, Pharmatech, entered into a standard form contract. As

194. Lake Placid Club Attached Lodges v. Elizabethtown Builders, Inc., 521 N.Y.S.2d 165,
166 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). In Lake Placid Club, condo owners could not sue the builder and
architect for structural defects in units because no privity of contract existed. Id. Owners were not
third party beneficiaries of the contract between the. builder and architect and the developer because
nothing in the contract suggested that the developer intended to give rights to the owners. Id. The
developer's only motive was to obtain a sufficient construction product to sell to potential customers.
Id. See also Rieder Communities, Inc. v. Township of N. Brunswick, 546 A.2d 563, 567 (N.J.
Super. 1988); Ward v. Ernst & Young, 435 S.E.2d 628, 631 (Va. 1993); Guardian Constr. Co. v.
Tetra Tech Richardson, Inc., 583 A.2d 1378, 1387 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990).
195. Rieder Communities, 546 A.2d at 567.
196. Id.
197. Ward, 435 S.E.2d at 630-36.
198. Guardian, 583 A.2d at 1387 (citing RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcTS § 311(3)

(1979)).
199. Id.
200. Guardian Constr. Co. v. Tetra Tech Richardson, Inc., 583 A.2d 1378, 1387 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1990).
201. A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397, 403 (Fla. 1973).
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previously mentioned, this standard contract is the 13141.2 ' 2 There is nothing
in the B141 which would indicate that the contractor, in this case Capital
Construction, was a third party beneficiary of the contract, such that a cause of
action could be sustained. 3 In fact, in the owner-contractor contract, this

theory is specifically rejected.'
Regardless of which jurisdiction governs the
introductory hypothetical scenario,' Capital would most likely not be able to
recover economic losses from Archiwerks under a third party beneficiary theory
in the face of the B141 and the A201'
Interestingly, there is nothing about the economic loss doctrine which would
prohibit recovery of economic losses under a theory of third party
beneficiary. 7 Since such losses are contemplated by the contracting parties
and the third party is the intended beneficiary of the contract, recovery could be

had in the face of the doctrine."
Thus, if a warranty is given to a third
party, liability would attach for economic losses despite the lack of privity.'
In the absence of such express language, however, most contractors must rely
on tort theory in order to recover economic losses from an architect.
B. Tort
Architects, like manufacturers of products, are strictly liable2 ' ° for torts

involving personal injury or property damage.2 1'

However, they have not

202. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
203. Bib Constr. Co. v. City of Poughkeepsie, 612 N.Y.S.2d 283, 284-85 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994).
204. A201, supra note 28, 1.1.2. The text of the contract reads: "The Contract Documents
shall not be construed to create a contractual relationship of any kind... between the Architect and
Contractor...." Id.
205. The situs of the construction project determines what law will apply in later disputes. Id.
113.1.1.
206. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
209. Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 148 (Cal. 1965).
210. Strict liability is liability without intention or negligence on the part of the defendant.
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 452 (Ill. 1982); Seely, 403 P.2d at
149-50. Strict liability in tort was designed to govern the distinct problem of physical injuries. Id.
at 149. The "recognition that the remedies of injured consumers ought not to be made to depend
upon the intricacies of the law of sales caused this court to abandon the fiction of warranty in favor
of strict liability .... Id. at 149-50 (citations omitted).
211. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 313 (N.J. 1965). The "strict liability
in tort formulation of the nature of the manufacturer's burden to expected consumers of his product
represents a sound solution to an evergrowing problem .... ." Id. at 312. At the time Santorwas
decided, privity was not necessary to recover economic losses in the commercial context in other
jurisdictions as well: Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 181 N.E.2d 399 (N.Y.
1962); Jamot v. Ford Motor Co., 156 A.2d 568 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1959); Continental Copper & Steel
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been held to strict liability where pure economic losses have been claimed.2"
In these cases, courts have struggled with, and in most instances found," 3 a
duty" 4 on the part of the architect to protect the commercial expectations of
third parties, such as contractors. The breach of this duty which causes harm
to third parties has led to two theories of recovery-negligence and negligent
21
misrepresentation. 1
1. Negligence Theory
The plaintiff suing a third party for recovery of economic losses has the
burden of proof of establishing a duty which the third party breached and that
Indus., Inc. v. E.C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So. 2d 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 110 N.W.2d 449 (Iowa 1961); Picker X-Ray Corp.
v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919 (D.C. 1962); General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 338
S.W.2d 655 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960). Increasingly, courts have found that architects under the
traditional construction arrangement bear responsibility to act in situations where they are the only
party in a position to prevent a loss. Justin Sweet, Site Architects and Construction Workers:
Brothers and Keepers or Strangers?, 28 EMORY L.J. 291 (1979) (discussing physical harm to
construction workers caused by the negligence of architects).
212. Seely, 403 P.2d at 149. Torts involving personal injury are seen as products liability and
are distinguishable from economic losses (strict liability versus negligence theory). A.R. Moyer,
Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla. 1973). Although most jurisdictions reject the economic
loss doctrine for professionals, most also do not apply a strict liability approach with respect to
economic losses. See, e.g., Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. John C. Morris Assocs., 418 A.2d 1290,
1292 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980).
Architectural services are not "products" under the UCC. Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co.
v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 881 P.2d 986, 990 (Wash. 1994). Therefore, the common law must
be looked to in order to determine whether a contractor may recover economic loss in tort. Id.
But see Spivak v. Berks Ridge Corp., 586 A.2d 402, 405 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). In Spivak,
homeowners sued the builder with whom the homeowner had no privity for the construction of a
defective condominium. Id. at 404. The court found that the builder impliedly warranted that the
house built by it was constructed in a reasonable workmanlike manner and was fit for habitation.
Id. at 405.
Such warranties arise by operation of law, independent of any contractual
representations. Id. Similarly, third party plaintiffs have used the above rationale to justify tort
action against an architect, in which an architect impliedly warrants that the plans and specifications
are done in a non-negligent manner to all foreseeable users, including contractors. Donelly Constr.
Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 677 P.2d 1292, 1297 (Ariz. 1984).
213. Bacco Constr. Co. v. American Colloid Co., 384 N.W.2d 427, 434 (Mich. Ct. App.
1986). In Bacco, a prime contractor was allowed to sue an engineer for economic loss when the
engineer specified a sewer system which did not meet specifications represented in the contract
documents after installed. Id. "Ur]he clear trend ... is to allow a negligence action without direct
privity of contract." Id. at 433. See also Wagner, supra note 11, at 252.
214. Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d 324, 326 (Ill. 1982). "The measure of liability in
a tort action is based rather on the scope of duty owed to the plaintiff." Id. (internal citations
omitted).
215. Intentional torts are not analyzed in this note. For such an analysis consult Quatman,
supra note 6, at 588-89.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1996

288

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 1 [1996], Art. 8

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

this breach proximately caused his or her damages. 211 Proximate cause helps
stem unlimited liability for economic loss.2" 7 Although privity is not necessary
to bring a tort action, some courts have held that proximate cause can only exist
2 s
when the parties' relationship is so close as to "approach . . . privity."
219
Contributory or comparative negligence may also limit or bar recovery.
The imputation of duty, more than causation, is the facet of negligence with
which courts have struggled.'
Those jurisdictions which do not require strict

216. See Wise, supra note 61, at 5.
217. Id.
218. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 446 (N.Y. 1931); Ossining Union Free Sch.
Dist. v. Anderson, 539 N.E.2d 91, 95 (N.Y. 1989). In Ossining, the defendant-engineerhad been
retained by a school district's architect to evaluate the structural soundness of one of the school
district's buildings. Id. at 92. The court found the "functional equivalent" of privity to exist where
the engineers allegedly "undertook their work in the knowledge that it was for the school district
alone . . . . land] rendered their reports with the objective of thereby shaping this plaintiffs
conduct." Id. at 91, 95-96. The engineer had direct contact with the school district and sent a bill
directly to the school district. Id. The concept of duty in tort has thus been construed narrowly by
New York courts. See, e.g., Security Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 597
N.E.2d 1080 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Resnick Water St. Dev. Co.,
555 N.Y.S.2d 367 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); Briar Contracting Corp. v. City of N.Y., 550 N.Y.S.2d
717 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). The relationship between an architect and contractor may approach
privity if there was direct communication, a client relationship, or other special circumstances
linking them. Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 859 F.2d 242, 247 n.5 (2d Cir. 1988).
Under certain circumstances, accountants may be held liable to third parties for economic loss. See
Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110, 118 (N.Y. 1985). See also
supra note 182 and accompanying text.
219. Wise, supra note 61, at 5. See also Lutz Eng'g Co. v. Industrial Louvers, Inc., 585 A.2d
631, 636-37 (R.I. 1991).
220. Sandarac Ass'n, Inc. v. W.R. Frizzell Architects, Inc., 609 So. 2d 1349, 1352-53 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1992). "Duty in negligence requires a relationship in which one person is determined
to have a responsibility to protect some interest of another person." Id. at 1352. "The actor is
liable for an invasion of an interest of another, if . . . the interest invaded is protected against
unintentional invasion. .. ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965).

A defendant's duty

may arise from a social relationship as well as from a contractual relationship. Williams v. Jackson
Co., 359 So. 2d 798, 801 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978). Although plaintiff may be barred from recovering
from defendant as a third party beneficiary to defendant's contract with another, plaintiff may
nevertheless recover in negligence for defendant's breach of duty where defendant negligently
performs his contract with knowledge that others are relying on proper performance and the resulting
harm is reasonably foreseeable. Id. See also E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co., 551 F.2d
1026 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that under Alabama law an electrical subcontractor on a construction
project may proceed on a negligence theory in an action against an architect absent contractual
privity between them); Zeigler v. Blount Bros. Constr. Co., 364 So. 2d 1163 (Ala. 1978) (holding
that recovery would be allowed absent privity if damages are foreseeable). The rationale behind the
rejection of the privity requirement was stated by Prosser:
[B]y entering into a contract with A, the defendant may place himself in such a relation
toward B that the law will impose upon him an obligation, sounding in tort and not in
contract, to act in such a way that B will not be injured. The incidental fact of the
existence of the contract with A does not negative the responsibility of the actor when
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privity in order to recover losses have imputed a duty where the architect has
actual knowledge that the third party will suffer economic losses if the architect
is negligent."I The actual knowledge requirement, though, has since been
abandoned.'
Most courts now hold that if harm is reasonably foreseeable to
expectations of
a third party, a duty will be imputed to protect the commercial
223
the third party as part of the architect's standard of care.

he enters upon a course of affirmative conduct which may be expected to affect the
interests of another person.
WILLiAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 93 at 622 (4th ed. 1971). Applying
this rationale to the construction context, some courts rely on the presence of six factors to determine
whether or not to impose a duty:
(1) [tihe extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiftl;l (2) [t]he
foreseeability of harm to him[;] (3) [tlhe degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury[;] (4) [t]he
closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the
injury suffered[;] (5) [tlhe moral blame attached to defendant's conduct[; and] (6) [t]he
policy of preventing future harm.
Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. John C. Morris Assocs., 418 A.2d 1290, 1292 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1980) (internal citations omitted). See also generally Howe v. Bishop, 446 So. 2d 11 (Ala. 1984)
(Torbert, C.J., concurring); United Leasing Corp. v. Miller, 263 S.E.2d 313 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
221. Peyronnin Constr. Co. v. Weiss, 208 N.E.2d 489, 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 1965).
222. Wise, supra note 61, at 5-6.
223. A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397, 400 (Fla. 1973) (holding that "the extent
of [an architect's] duty may best be defined by reference to the foreseeability of injury consequent
upon breach of that duty" (citing Audlane Lbr. & Bldrs. Sup. v. D.E. Britt, 168 So. 2d 333, 335
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964))); Donnelly Constr. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 677 P.2d 1292, 1296
(Ariz. 1984) (holding that design professionals are liable for foreseeable injuries to foreseeable
victims which proximately result from negligent performance of their professional duties).
Another member of the design professional group, engineers, can be analyzed in a similar
fashion. See Aliberti, LaRochelle & Hodson Eng'g Corp. v. FDIC, 844 F. Supp. 832 (D. Me.
1994). In Aliberti, a bank was allowed to sue a consulting engineer with whom it had no privity for
negligence. Id. at 846. The engineer, who had a contract with a developer of a housing project,
had made affirmative misrepresentations to the bank regarding the development's overall budget and
feasibility. Id. at 845. The bank relied upon these misrepresentations in approving loans for the
project. Id. at 846. The project was later abandoned by the developer and the bank suffered
economic losses as a result. Id. at 838.
See also Doran-Maine, Inc. v. American Eng'g & Testing, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 609 (D. Me.
1985). In Doran-Maine, a subcontractor was allowed to sue a supervising engineer, with whom it
had no contract, for negligence. Id. at 615. Pursuant to its contract with the general contractor,
the engineer negligently tested concrete pipe fabricated by the subcontractor and reported that the
pipe did not meet the specifications, after which the contractor terminated its contract with the
subcontractor. Id. The court agreed with the notion that, "[i]f an actor 'should have realized that
his conduct might cause harm to another in substantially the manner in which it is brought about,
the harm is universally regarded as the legal consequence of the actor's negligence.'" Id. at 615
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 cmt. b (1965)).
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Foreseeability has been defined in several different ways by courts in
Many courts have focused on the degree of
deciding if a duty exists. 2
control the architect has over the contractor's work. 2 5 Other courts have
224. See Donnelly, 677 P.2d at 1295-96. In Donnelly, a contractor was allowed to recover
economic losses from an architect with whom it had no privity on theories of negligence, negligent
misrepresentation, and breach of implied warranty that the architect's plans and specifications were
accurate. Id. at 1296-97. After being awarded the construction contract for a school renovation,
the contractor noticed that the plans and specifications that the architect had prepared had substantial
errors. Id. at 1293-94. These errors resulted in increased costs of construction to the contractor.
Id. at 1294. The court reasoned that for duty in a negligence action to lie both the plaintiff and the
risk must be foreseeable to a reasonable person, and that a broad view would be taken of the class
of risks and victims that are foreseeable. Id. at 1295. See also generally McFarlin v. Hall, 619
P.2d 729 (Ariz. 1980). "Design professionals have a duty to use ordinary skill, care, and diligence
in rendering their professional services," not only to those with whom the design professional is in
privity, but also to those whom it is not. Donnelly, 677 P.2d at 1295. Also, with respect to the
implied warranty claim, design professionals, in the absence of an express guarantee, do not warrant
that their work is accurate, but they do warrant that they have exercised their skills with care and
diligence and in a reasonable, non-negligent manner. Id. at 1297. Thus, a claim for breach of
implied warranty does not, in this context, require privity. Id.
See also Owen v. Dodd, 431 F. Supp. 1239 (N.D. Miss. 1977). In Owen, a contractor was
allowed to sue an architect with whom it had no privity for economic loss in the form of increased
construction costs. Id. at 1242. The problems stemmed from an accumulation of water on the site
which was alleged to have been caused by the architect's negligent preparation of a drainage plan
for the construction site. Id. at 1240. The court held that an architect's duty to use reasonable'care
in the preparation of plans and specifications extended to the contractor who relied on those
documents and as a proximate result was injured economically. Id. at 1242. See generally Daniel
Witherspoon, When is an Architect Liable?, 32 MiSS. L.J. 40 (1960).
See also Mid-Western Elec., Inc. v. DeWild Grant Reckert & Assocs., 500 N.W.2d 250 (S.D.
1993). In Mid-Western, an electrical subcontractor was allowed to sue an engineer with whom it
had no privity for recovery of economic losses allegedly sustained as a result of negligent approval
of equipment. Id. at 254. A series of Ultraviolet light (UV) detectors were to be installed for a
governmental entity. Id. at 252. The equipment was approved by the engineer and installed, but
later rejected by the owner. Id. The subcontractor had to replace the equipment himself and later
sued the engineer for its losses. Id. The court held that claims of professional negligence in which
damages to a foreseeable third party are suffered will determine whether a duty in tort exists to
protect that third party. Id. at 254. The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would be "condoning
a professional's right to do his or her job negligently with impunity as far as innocent parties who
suffer economic loss." Id.
225. Moyer, 285 So. 2d at 401. In Moyer, a prime contractor was allowed to recover from an
architect for negligently stopping the work and preparing plans and specs. Id. The court made
much of the fact that the architect had direct control over the contractor. Id. Other factors were
also balanced: (1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the
degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; (3) the closeness of the connection between the
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered; (4) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct;
and (5) the policy of preventing future harm. Id. (quoting Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19
(Cal. 1958)).
Similarly, in United States ex rel. Los Angeles Testing Lab. v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp.
132 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (en banc), under the prime-owner agreement, the architect had the authority
of general supervision as well as the authority to stop the work. Id. at 134-35. A claim based on
negligent supervision/approval of defective work by the architect was allowed. Id. at 136. The
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court held that the architect had altogether
too much control over the contractor.

291

. for him not to be placed under a duty imposed

by law to perform without negligence his functions as they affect the contractor. The
power of the architect to stop the work alone is tantamount to a power of economic life
or death over the contractor. It is only just that such authority, exercised in such a
relationship, carry commensurate legal responsibility.
2.6.6. Under the B141, the architect no longer has direct
Id. But see B141, supra note 27,
control over the work. Id. That power is reserved to the owner. The architect can, however, reject
the work. Id. 2.6.11.
The extent of an architect's duty to a contractor on the jobsite has been a particularly fertile
area for litigation. See, e.g., Berkel & Co. Contractors v. Providence Hosp., 454 So. 2d 496 (Ala.
1984). In Berkel, a contractor was allowed to sue an architect for economic losses associated with
the architect's allegedly negligent direction of the installation of concrete piles. Id. at 503.
See also Magnolia Constr. Co. v. Mississippi Gulf South Eng'rs, Inc., 518 So. 2d 1194 (Miss.
1988). In Magnolia, a contractor was able to sue an engineer without privity for economic losses
based on a theory of negligence. Id. at 1201, 1204. The contractor had been denied final payment
by the engineer because it was determined that some sewer sections installed by the contractor were
at the wrong depth. Id. at 1197. However true that may have been, the engineer had a
representative present on the jobsite at all times that had certified payment to the contractor up to
that point, giving the impression that the work was being done properly. Id. The court held that
the contractor could reasonably rely on the representatives to provide any guidance with respect to
the progress of the work. Id. at 1202.
See also Shoffner Indus. v. W.B. Lloyd Constr. Co., 257 S.E.2d 50 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
In Shoffner, a contractor was able to sue an architect in tort for recovery of economic losses
allegedly caused by the architect's negligent approval of defective materials. Id. at 56. The
architect approved trusses for a structure on which the contractor was working; the contractor
installed them, and they were later discovered to be defective. Id. at 52. This discovery caused the
contractor to incur additional labor cost and materials to rectify the situation. Id. The court
reasoned that "the incidental fact of the existence of the contract between the architect and the
property owner should not negative the responsibility of the architect when he enters upon a course
of affirmative conduct which may be expected to affect the interest of third parties." Id. at 59.
See also Forte Bros. v. National Amusements, Inc., 525 A.2d 1301 (R.I. 1987). In Forte,
a third party contractor was allowed to sue for negligence against an architect/site engineer
notwithstanding a lack of privity. Id. at 1303. The court held that the architect owed the contractor
a duty to render his site inspection services professionally. Id.
See also Detweiler Bros. v. John Graham & Co., 412 F. Supp. 416 (E.D. Wash. 1976). In
Detweiler, a federal court applying Washington law allowed a subcontractor to sue an architectural
firm in tort for economic losses the subcontractor suffered through alleged misrepresentations by the
architect. Id. at 418. The architect had approved the subcontractor's submittal for a certain type
of grooved piping and later ordered the subcontractor to stop the work and replace the grooved pipe
with welded pipe. Id. The court held that privity of contract was not a condition precedent to the
maintenance of a tort suit by a contractor against an architect. Id. at 420. The court found
justification for its holding in the "emerging majority ofjurisdictions [which] have taken the position
that a contractor can maintain a negligence action against an architect without direct privity of
contract between the parties." Id. at 419.
See generally, Jeffrey L. Nischwitz, Note, The Crumbling Tower of ArchitecturalImmunity:
Evolution and Expansion of the Liability to Third Parties,45 OHIo ST. L.J. 217 (1984) (concluding
that architects should be liable for negligent preparation of plans and specs because the architect is
in the best position to effectuate duties with respect to design, but not supervision of construction
methods because an architect's emphasis is on design, not construction).
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focused on what the "reasonable architect"'
would deem foreseeable. 2 7
This focus includes what the architect knew or should have known. In the latter
case, such a standard would allow a court to find a duty not only to contractors,
but to other parties who have a specific pecuniary interest in the project as
well.22

Capital, the contractor in the introductory hypothetical scenario,
able to assert a claim for negligence against the architect, Archiwerks.
could argue that the assurances given by the manufacturers of "painless"
as its own protests made the actions of Archiwerks unjustified.
unjustified actions were proved as such when further testing confirmed

may be
Capital
as well
These
exactly

226. An architect, in the performance of his contract with his employer, is required to exercise
the ability, skill, and care customarily used by architects upon such projects. 5 AM. JUR. 2D,
Architects § 10, 632-33 (1995).
227. Cooper v. Jevne, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). In Cooper, a cause of action
by purchasers of a house was allowed against an architect with whom no privity existed. Id. at 729.
"[The architects were under a duty to exercise ordinary care as architects to avoid reasonably
foreseeable injury to purchasers and that the architects knew or should have foreseen with reasonable
certainty that [the] purchasers would suffer the specific monetary damages alleged if they failed to
perform this professional duty." Id. at 727-28. Thus, a cause of action for negligence was allowed.
Accord Mid-Western Elec., 500 N.W.2d at 253 (noting that "[tioday the majority of jurisdictions
that have examined this question allow a cause of action against an architect or engineer for
economic damage if a party was foreseeably harmed by the professional's negligence").
See also Waldor Pump & Equip. Co. v. Orr-Schelen-Mayeron & Assocs., 386 N.W.2d 375
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986). In Waldor, a subcontractor was allowed to sue an engineer with whom it
had no privity for negligence in drafting and interpreting specifications. Id. at 377. The engineer,
pursuant to a contract with the city for the updating of a wastewater treatment plant, prepared plans
and specifications and supervised the construction of the project. Id. at 376. The engineer rejected
a pump supplied by the subcontractor which conformed in all material aspects to the specifications.
Id. The subcontractor was forced to provide a more expensive pump and suffered economic loss
as a result. Id. The court reasoned:
Architects, doctors, engineers, attorneys, and others deal in somewhat inexact sciences
and are continually called upon to exercise their skilled judgment in order to anticipate
and provide for random factors which are incapable of precise measurement. The
indeterminate nature of these factors makes it impossible for professional service people
to gauge them with complete accuracy in every instance . . . . Because of the
inescapable possibility of error which inheres in these services, the law has traditionally
required, not perfect results, but rather the exercise of that skill and judgment which can
be reasonably expected from similarly situated professionals.
Id. at 377 (citation omitted). The court concluded that it was foreseeable to the engineer that
subcontractors were bound to follow the specifications and that the engineer's negligence in drafting
or interpreting them would cause harm to the subcontractor. Id. Accord Associated Architects &
Eng'rs v. Lubbock Glass & Mfg. Co., 422 S.W.2d 942, 944-45 ('ex. Civ. App. 1967) (allowing
an action by a subcontractor against an architect for negligence in the preparation of plans and
specifications and negligence in rejecting skylights furnished according to the architect's defective
plans and specifications).
228. Cooper v. Jevne, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); National Sand, Inc. v. Nagel
Constr., Inc., 451 N.W.2d 618, 620 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (allowing a subcontractor to maintain
an action in tort against an engineer with whom the subcontractor had no privity).
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what the manufacturer and Capital had maintained from the beginning, that
"painless" had the same characteristics as stainless steel. Archiwerks had a duty
to protect against Capital's economic losses which it breached when it
negligently delayed accepting the shop drawings depicting "painless." As a
proximate result of this negligent delay, Capital suffered damages in the form
of lost profits. A negligence action, when viewed in light of the plans and
specifications, may also give. Capital a cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation.
2. Negligent Misrepresentation Theory
A cause of action based on negligent misrepresentation is similar to one
based on straight negligence, and they are often asserted together under the same
facts.'
The former theory is distinguishable from the latter because it
focuses on the information provided by the maker, rather than solely the duty
of care owed by the maker.'
Although the same breach of the professional
standard of care gives rise to both claims, the negligent misrepresentation is
equivalent to a breach of warranty because of the special relationship between
those who rely on the information negligently supplied and those who supplied
the information to the recipient to conduct their business."1
Thus, the

229. Ossining Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Anderson, 539 N.E.2d 91 (N.Y. 1989). In Ossining,
a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation which produced only economic injury was allowed
where the underlying relationship between the parties was so close as to be the functional equivalent
of privity. Id. at 91. The relationship had approachedprivity because: (1) the defendant was aware
that one of the purposes of its design plans was to assist the construction companies in their
preparation of bids for the project; (2) the defendant knew that the subcontractor was part of a
definable class which would rely on the plans; (3) there was conduct between the defendant and the
subcontractor evincing and the defendant's understanding that the subcontractor had, in fact, relied
on the plans in preparing the bid. Id. at 95.
Accord Reliance Ins. Co. v. Morris Assocs., P.C., 607 N.Y.S.2d 106 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
In Reliance, the subrogee of a subcontractor was allowed to sue an engineer, who negligently
prepared sewer plans, for economic losses. Id. at 107. The subcontractor relied on these plans in
preparing a bid, and as a result, the cost to complete the project was higher than what the
subcontractor was paid (i.e. the bid price). Id.
230. Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 275-76 (N.Y. 1922). See also Bernard Johnson, Inc.
v. Continental Constructors, Inc., 630 S.W.2d 365, 370 (rex. App. 1982). See supra notes 220-28
and accompanying text.
231. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 446 (N.Y. 1931). See also Spivak v. Berks
Ridge Corp., 586 A.2d 402 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). In Spivak, homeowners sued the builder (with
whom it had no privity) for the construction of a defective condominium. Id. at 404. The court
found that the builder impliedly warranted that the house built by it was constructed in a reasonable
workmanlike manner and was fit for habitation. Id. at 405. "Such warranties arise by operation
of law, independent of any contractual representations." Id. Similarly, third party plaintiffs have
used the above rationale to justify tort action against an architect, in which an architect impliedly
warrants that the plans and specifications are done in a professional manner to all foreseeable users,
including contractors. Donnelly Constr. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 677 P.2d 1292, 1297 (Ariz.
1984).
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foreseeability requirement is taken a step further-the faulty information given
on the plans and specifications must be intended by its negligent supplier to be
specifically relied upon by a particular party or a settled class of parties before
economic damages are recoverable, and this class must reasonably rely on the
information negligently supplied. 2
Like simple negligence, negligent misrepresentation has the requirement of
foreseeability, but adds the additional requirement that the contractor reasonably
rely on the information. 3 The defenses of comparative and contributory
The issues of foreseeability and reasonable
negligence also still apply.'
reliance are demonstrated in two opinions from New York which were both
written by Justice (then Judge) Benjamin Cardozo. In the first, Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche,23 an accounting firm was sued for economic losses sustained
This client, a
by a creditor of one of the accounting firm's clients.'
business, had procured the services of the firm to prepare a financial statement
After receiving the report, which had negligently
of the business. 37
overstated the business' financial situation, the business used the report to secure
a loan from a lender."3 The lender relied on the information in the report in
making the loan. 9 After the business failed and the misstatement was
revealed, the lender/creditor sought to recover its losses from the accounting
The court held that the creditor did not have a cause of action."'
firm.'
The court reasoned that it was foreseeable to the accounting firm that the
information would be relied upon by the client, but not by third parties which
had not been disclosed to the accounting firm at the time it made its report."
The report had been prepared specifically for the client. 3 To expose
accountants to liability to an indeterminate class of users who may happen to use
the information was too remote to be actionable.'

232. Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 277 (N.Y. 1922).
233. Wise, supra note 61, at 5. A contractor's reliance on specifications must be reasonable.
APAC-Carolina, Inc. v. Greensboro-High Point Airport Auth., 431 S.E.2d 508, 517 (N.C. Ct. App.
1993). Accord Lutz Eng'g v. Industrial Louvers, Inc., 585 A.2d 631, 636-37 (R.I. 1991). See also
supra note 6 and accompanying text.
234. Wise, supra note 61, at 5.
235. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
236. Id. at 442.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 443.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Ultramares v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (N.Y. 1931).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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The second case, Glanzer v. Shepard,2s was decided earlier than
Ultramares. There, the court held that a weigher of beans, who had negligently
misstated the weight of the beans to the buyer, was liable for economic losses
Unlike in Ultramares, here the two
to the buyer even without privity.'
requirements for negligent misrepresentation had been met." 7 First, the
weigher had intended the buyer to rely on the information given, and the
Second, it was
information was reasonably relied upon by the buyer.'
foreseeable that the buyer would suffer loss if the information was false.2 9
Judge Cardozo's opinion in Glanzer is echoed by Section 552 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts,' which is in line with modem legal authority on the

245. 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
246. Id. at 277.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 275-76.
249. Id. at 277.
250. RESTATmEENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1979): Information Negligently Supplied for
the Guidance of Others.
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss
caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise
reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) [rlhe liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered (a) by the person
or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply
the information or knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and (b) through reliance
upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to influence or knows that the
recipient so intends or in a substantially similar transaction.
Comment (a) to § 552 provides:
[l]t does not follow that every user of commercial information may hold every maker
to a duty of care. Unlike the duty of honesty, the duty of care to be observed in
supplying information for use in commercial transactions implies an undertaking to
observe a relative standard, which may be defined only in terms of the use to which the
information will be put, weighed against the magnitude and probability of loss that
might attend that use if the information proves to be incorrect. A user of commercial
information cannot reasonably expect its maker to have undertaken to satisfy this
obligation unless the terms of the obligation were known to him. Rather, one who relies
upon information in connection with a commercial transaction may reasonably expect
to hold the maker to a duty of care only in circumstances in which the maker was
manifestly aware of the use to which the information was to be put and intended to
supply it for that purpose.
Id. This model has been widely endorsed by state courts. See Guardian Constr. Co. v. Tetra Tech
Richardson, Inc., 583 A.2d 1378, 1385-86 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990). Section 552 would abolish the
privity requirement in certain cases of negligent misrepresentation. Id. In those cases where the
privity requirement would be abolished, "the use of the information negligently supplied was not an
indirect or collateral consequence [of the transaction]... it was the end and aim of the transaction."
Id. at 1386.
As a countervailing view to Section 552, economic damages resulting from a party who
negligently makes the performance of a contract more expensive to perform are not recoverable
absent physical harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C (1979). But see comment e
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subject of negligent misrepresentation.251
Under the Restatement, negligently prepared plans or ambiguous
specifications give contractors a cause of action against architects for economic
First, the recipient of the information, although unknown to the
loss. 2

(stating that Section 766C may not apply if Section 552 applies).
251. Guardian, 583 A.2d at 1386.
252. For an example of a claim of defective specifications, see Bryant Elec. Co. v. City of
Fredericksburg, 762 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1985). In Bryant, a general contractor sued the project
architect (with whom it had no privity) for economic loss of delay and additional expense related to
errors in the plans and specifications as well as the failure of the architect to detect the errors before
the defective design was built. Id. at 1192-93. The court held that the lack of privity prevented the
contractor from recovering. Id. at 1195.
Cf. Carroll-Boone Water Dist. v. M. & P. Equip. Co., 661 S.W.2d 345 (Ark. 1983). In
Carroll-Boone, a subcontractor was allowed to sue an engineer with whom it had no privity. Id.
at 354. In order for a water intake structure designed by the engineer to become operational, a rock
mass needed to be removed. Id. at 347-48. The specifications for the structure required blasting
to remove the rock. Id. at 348. The intake structure had not been designed to withstand such blasts,
and was damaged by the blasting. Id. As a result, the subcontractor incurred liability to the owner
for repair and was thus able to sue the engineer for negligence. Id. at 354.
See also Wolther v. Schaarschmidt, 738 P.2d 25 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986). In Wolther, a
homeowner was allowed to sue an engineer with whom it had no privity based upon a theory of
negligent misrepresentation. Id. at 28. The homeowner's lender had entered into a contract with
the engineer to prepare a report about the structural fitness of the house that the homeowner intended
to purchase. Id. at 26-27. The engineer approved the structural fitness of the home and the
homeowner was given a loan to purchase the home by the lender. Id. at 27. Later, it was
discovered that some floor joists were termite-infested and had to be replaced. Id. The court held
that it was foreseeable to the engineer that the homeowner would rely on the engineer's report to
the lender as confirmation that the house was structurally sound. Id. at 28.
For a theory of liability based on defective plans, see Gurtler, Hebert & Co. v. Weyland
Mach. Shop, 405 So. 2d 660 (La. Ct. App. 1981). In Gurter, a subcontractor was allowed to
recover from an architect in tort. Id. at 662. The subcontractor had alleged that plans and
specifications supplied by the architect failed "to provide a satisfactory and complete set of...
drawings from which shop drawings could be made resulting in multiple revisions, and eventually,
the creation of a new set of shop drawings . . . ." Id. at 661. The delay caused by the negligently
prepared plans and specifications led to liability for damages on the part of the subcontractor to the
general. Id. at 662.
See also Milton J. Womack, Inc. v. House of Representatives, 509 So. 2d 62 (La. Ct. App.
1987). In Womack, a contractor was allowed to recover economic loss damages from an architect
with whom it had no privity based on a theory of negligence. Id. at 67. The plans and
specifications prepared by the architect failed to depict wind-bracing within the existing State Capitol
building, resulting in a delay while the architect prepared revised plans. Id. at 63-64. The delay
resulted in the lost opportunity of the contractor to receive a bonus from the State for finishing the
job early. Id. at 63. The court held that the architect had not exercised "the degree of skill
ordinarily employed, under similar circumstances, by members of [its] profession. . . and to use
reasonable care and diligence, along with [its] best judgment, in the application of [its] skill." Id.
at 64. The court reasoned that a check of the drawings for the original building would have revealed
the wind-bracing to the architect. Id.
Engineers have also been subject to liability under this cause of action based upon reports that
they prepare. See Davidson & Jones, Inc. v. County of New Hanover, 255 S.E.2d 580 (N.C. Ct.
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architect at the time the plans were prepared, is well known to the architect as
a class of persons who will rely on the information provided. 3 Second, in
order for the building to be built, the plans must be followed. The architect
knows or should know that reliance by the contractor on false information may
But the defenses of comparative and
result in losses to the contractor.'
contributory negligence still apply. 5 On this point the issue of whether the
contractor's reliance was reasonable becomes important. 6 But reliance on
the specifications is sometimes warranted if a discrepancy 257exists between
information on the plans and information in the specifications.
In the introductory hypothetical scenario, the contractor, Capital, may be
able to assert a claim for negligent misrepresentation against the architect,
Archiwerks, if the construction documents were ambiguous as to what tests or
data would be required for "equals."'
An argument can be made that
contractors in general, as well as Capital in particular, would need such
information before they would decide to use an equal not specified explicitly by
the architect. 259 It was foreseeable to Archiwerks that ambiguous specifications might cause delays to Capital in this regard. This argument, even in
jurisdictions which have adopted the economic loss doctrine, has been
persuasive. However, even in those jurisdictions, courts have struggled over the

App. 1979). In Davidson, a general contractor who submitted bids and engaged in construction in
reliance on a soil report was allowed to sue the engineers who prepared the report for damages
caused by negligence in the report's preparation. Id. at 585-86.
See also Stanford v. Owens, 265 S.E.2d 617 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980). In Stanford, a buyer of
property was allowed to sue an engineering firm who had prepared a report of the property for the
seller. Id. at 624-25. The report detailed the subsurface condition of the property and concluded
that the property could support the building that the buyer was proposing to build. Id. at 624. Soon
after the purchase of the property and construction of the building, the buyer discovered cracks in
the building which rendered it useless. Id. The court relied on Davidson to hold the engineer liable
for the buyer's loss. Id. at 625.
253. Ossining Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Anderson, 539 N.E.2d 91, 95 (N.Y. 1989); U.S. ex
rel. Los Angeles Testing Lab. v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132, 136 (S.D. Cal. 1958). In
Rogers, an architect negligently interpreted and construed reports, resulting in the prime contractor
being able to assert a claim of negligent misrepresentation against the architect. Id. The court
reasoned that it was reasonably foreseeable to the architect that reliance on the reports by the
contractor would lead to economic losses if those reports were negligently prepared. Id. See also
Rieder Communities, Inc. v. Township of North Brunswick, 546 A.2d 563 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1988).
254. See supra notes 224-27 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
257. UniconManagement Corp. v. United States, 375 F.2d 804 (Ct. Cl. 1967). SWEET, supra
note 23, at 434.
258. See, e.g., Waldor Pump & Equip. Co. v. Orr-Schelen-Mayeron & Assocs., 386 N.W.2d
375, 377 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). Qr Lutz Eng'g v. Industrial Louvers, Inc., 585 A.2d 631, 63536 (R.I. 1991) (denying recovery based on a theory of ambiguous specifications).
259. See Waldor, 386 N.W.2d at 377.
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issue of whether negligent misrepresentation is actionable.'
C. Rationale Behind the Rejection of the Economic Loss Doctrine
Most jurisdictions recognize some form of the economic loss doctrine." l
Most do not, however, extend the economic loss doctrine to the construction
A reason for this difference is that the duty analysis in the
context.'
construction context, with respect to both tort and contract, is more focused than
When professionals are rendering a
that in other commercial contexts.'
service, the duty of care required is higher than that of manufacturers supplying
For example, Delaware and Indiana have recognized the
a product.'
economic loss doctrine in the context of commercial transactions, but say that
the analysis is different when professionals, such as architects, are involved.'

260. See supra notes 109-15 and accompanyingtext. Illinois courts, though, have beenuniform
in disallowing claims for innocent misrepresentation. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co.,
435 N.E.2d 443 (Il. 1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C cmts. b, f (1977) (relating
to innocent misrepresentation: "Since the defendant's misrepresentation is an innocent one, he is
not held liable for other damages; specifically, he is not held liable for benefit of the bargain or for
consequential damages."). Negligent misrepresentation, however, was a specific exception to the
Moorman rule. See Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 452. See also 2314 Lincoln Park W. Condominium
Ass'n v. Mann, Gin, Ebel & Frazier, Ltd., 555 N.E.2d 346, 351-53 (11. 1990); Fence Rail Dev.
Corp. v. Nelson & Assocs., 528 N.E.2d 344, 348 (i. App. Ct. 1988).
261. See, e.g., Louisiana er rel. Guste v. MN Testhank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1032 (5th Cir. 1985).
262. Quatman, supra note 6, at 561.
263. Id.
264. See supra notes 220-28 and accompanying text. See also SwEET, supra note 23, at 31014.
265. See Danforth v. Acorn Structures, Inc., 608 A.2d 1194, 1201 n.5 (Del. 1992). In
Danforth, the plaintiff, the owner of a house, had obtained plans for the house from the defendant.
Id. at 1194-95. He then purchased from the defendant a "building package" for the home depicted
in the plans and employed a local contractor to build the house for him. Id. at 1195. The kit had
a two-year limited warranty. Id. Eight years later, the Plaintiff noticed rotting wood around the
windows which was later determined to have been caused by condensation in the walls produced
because of inadequate ventilation. Id. The plaintiff then sued the defendant for $100,000 in
corrective work, but was denied recovery despite privity. Id. at 1201. The court reasoned that the
warranty had expired and that no recovery would lie in tort. Id. at 1200-01. This decision, though,
was "not intended to address, and [did not] extend to, the question [of] whether the economic loss
doctrine bars recovery of economic loss caused by professional malpractice in tort." Id. at 1201
n.5. The court felt that tort concepts should be applied in such a case to determine if an architect
would be liable for the economic losses of the contractor: "[Clontract notions of privity are
irrelevant to the question whether a commercial seller owes a duty to foreseeable users of its
products, under tort law, to protect against the risk that its product, if defective, might damage only
itself." Id. at 1200. The court added: "Rather than obscure fundamental tort concepts with
contract notions of privity, we believe that it is analytically more useful to focus on the precise duty
of care that the law of negligence, not the law of contract or an agreement of the parties, has
imposed on the defendant." Id. (quoting Clark v. International Harvester Co., 581 P.2d 784, 794
(Idaho 1978)). See also supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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These professionals, in their view, should be held to a higher standard.'
While professionals are held to a higher standard of care than others in the
commercial context, professionals other than architects generally have no duty
to protect the commercial expectations of third parties. 67 This general rule
controls when the professional and the third party are adversaries. However,
this general rule has not been applied to the construction context even though
architects and contractors are adversaries in the traditional delivery system.
Rectifying this anomaly in the law of economic loss with respect to professionals
is the motivation behind this Note's proposal.
V.

PROPOSED TREATMENT OF ECONOMIC LOSS IN THE
CONSTRUCTION CONTEXT

This Note advocates a per se rule against architect liability for the economic
loss of the contractor in the traditional delivery system. Even if courts do not
accept the view that contract law is better suited than tort law to deal with
economic loss, 2" those courts can engage in a tort analysis' with the same
result. This proposal concludes that a duty on the part of the architect to the
contractor should not be found in the traditional delivery system. Courts that
have engaged in tort analysis" thus far have viewed the concept of duty in
light of the particular facts and circumstances of each case, such as the amount

Cf Peyronnin Constr. Co. v. Weiss, 208 N.E.2d 489, 495 (Ind. Ct. App. 1965) (holding that
a prime contractor could not sue an engineer because there existed no privity of contract, no
consideration, and no relationship existed to create a duty). But cf. Essex v. Ryan, 446 N.E.2d 368,
372 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that actual knowledge of the contractor's reliance on the plans
could result in a duty on the part of the engineer).
266. SeeCooper v. Jevne, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724, 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). In Cooper, the court
extended liability for economic loss despite the lack of privity. Id. This case was unlike Seely
because here the court was concerned with "the malpractice liability of a professional for negligence
in the rendition of his services and not that of a manufacturer for defects in his product." Id. at 728.
Thus an architect's duties to third parties is similar to that to beneficiaries of a will in the case of
attorney malpractice. Id.
This position is directly opposed to 2314 Lincoln Park W. CondominiumAss 'n v. Mann, Gin,
Ebel & Frazier, Ltd., 555 N.E.2d 346, 353 (Ill. 1990). There, the plaintiff's argument that the
application of the Moorman rule to its case would upset settled principles of malpractice liability in
other professions was found to be untenable because the relationship between architects and other
professionals was inapposite: (1) where health care professionals are concerned and personal injury
is usually alleged, such that Moorman is inapplicable; and (2) where attorneys are concerned, an
historical, noncontractual duty is imputed to the attorney to the client and the beneficiaries of the
client (that which concerns the nature of the undertaking, e.g. a fiduciary relationship). Id.
267. See infra notes 281, 283 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 99-125 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 210-60 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text (discussing "duty in tort" as a means by
which to determine whether or not to apply the economic loss doctrine).
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of control the architect had over the contractor's work,27' and whether the
economic injury to the contractor was foreseeable to the architect.' n This
Note proposes a different analysis of the concept of duty-one which looks at
the relationships among the parties and considers the ramifications of third party
recovery on the entire construction industry. Courts have already engaged in
a similar analysis with respect to other professions. 3 Therefore, this Note
simply urges courts to adopt similar judicial reasoning with respect to architects
involved in the traditional delivery system.
As a test to determine whether to apply the economic loss doctrine in the
construction context and thereby bar recovery of economic loss of third parties,
courts should ask the following question:
Assuming there is no contractual privity between the design
professional and the third party suffering harm, is the relationship
between these two parties, as determined by the owner, an amiable
one or an adversarialone?
If the answer to this question is "amiable," then the economic loss doctrine may
not be applied as a per se rule to bar recovery and the court may proceed to
engage in an established method 24 of determining the presence or absence of
a duty in tort. If the answer is "adversarial," the court should apply the
economic loss doctrine as a per se rule to bar recovery. With respect to the
traditional delivery system, the answer to this question will invariably be
"adversarial," in which case duty in tort should not be found. However, the
answer with respect to modem variations such as construction management 2"
or design/build"16 may be "amiable," in which case the court may proceed to
engage in a duty analysis.
271.
272.
273.
274.

See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 278-82 and accompanying text.
This duty analysis may be performed by the court preliminarily, as on motion for summary

judgment. See supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text. The court may also deny summary
judgment and reserve the duty analysis for trial. See supra notes 177-266 and accompanying text
(discussing generally third-party actions which have proceeded to trial). Both of these situations can
be contrasted to the procedure when viewing a traditional delivery system. When this system is
present, this note advocates a per se rule against duty in tort. Thus, adoption of this per se rule
would allow architects to be relieved of liability on a motion to dismiss.
275. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing recovery by a construction manager
against an architect in Strategem Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int'l N.V., 153 F.R.D. 535 (S.D.N.Y.
1994)). See also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
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The test advocated by this Note is grounded in concerns expressed by
courts faced with third party actions against other professionals such as
accountants and attorneys.' m The reasoning for such a test is simple. A client
who specifically designs relations between a professional and a third party to be
adversarial has those relations frustrated when the professional is forced to
consider the commercial expectations of the adversarial third party. First, an
analysis of relations among parties in other professions such as accounting and
law will illustrate the viability of this reasoning. Second, the application of this
reasoning to the construction context will demonstrate the adverse ramifications
of third party actions on the traditional delivery system.
Courts have generally held that, with respect to accountants, whether or not
a duty to third parties will lie depends on the relationship of the parties as
determined by the client.'
In Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, an accountant
was not held liable to a third party because the service it performed was
exclusively for the client.'m Conceivably, however, the court may have found
a duty if the relationship between the third party and the accountant had been an
amiable one. Whether a duty exists or not, then, depends upon the relationship
of the parties as determined by the client. The reasoning behind this rule is that
the adversarial relationship the client may wish to maintain between her
accountant and the third party would be frustrated if the accountant is forced to
consider the commercial expectations of that adversarial third party.'
The second group, attorneys, can be analyzed in a similar way to that of
accountants. Courts have held that, where attorneys are concerned, a historical,
non-contractual duty is imputed to the attorney to protect the client and the

277. These two professions are by no means exhaustive of the list of professions in which
economic loss is typically suffered by third parties. For example, an analysis of how courts have
viewed the duty of title abstractors to third parties can be found William B. Johnson, J.D.,
Annotation, Negligence in PreparingAbstract of Title as Ground of Liability to One Other than
Person OrderingAbstract, 50 A.L.R. 4TH 314 (1986 & Supp. 1996). Health care professionals are
not analyzed in this note because they are not normally involved in disputes concerning economic
loss. Usually, when they have breached a standard of care with respect to third parties, personal
injury has been suffered and thus liability is more readily found. See, e.g., 2314 Lincoln Park W.
Condominium Ass'n v. Mann, Gin, Ebel & Frazier, Ltd., 555 N.E.2d 346, 353 (Ill. 1990)
(discussing the irrelevance of economic loss with respect to health care professionals).
278. See Canaveral Capital Corp. v. Bruce, 214 So. 2d 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (holding
that third party liability would require gross negligence or intentional conduct to be actionable);
Landell v. Lybrand, 107 A. 783 (Pa. 1919) (holding that no duty exists on the part of accountants
to protect third parties from economic loss); Jack W. Shaw, Jr., Annotation, Liability of Public
Accountant to Third Parties, 46 A.L.R. 3D 979 (1972 & Supp. 1996).
279. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (N.Y. 1931).
280. See generally Shaw, supra note 278 (noting that a duty in tort depends on whether the
accountant's report is prepared primarily for the benefit of the third party).
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An example of this historical duty is
beneficiaries of the client."'
The client
demonstrated by an attorney who prepares a will for a client.'
wishes to provide for certain third parties as beneficiaries of the will. Clearly,
the attorney has a duty to protect the economic expectations of those
beneficiaries because the relationship between the attorney and the third parties,
as determined by the owner, is an amiable one.
For
The commercial context can be contrasted to this situation.'
example, an attorney who is retained by a seller of fungible goods to prepare a
contract between the seller and a potential buyer of such goods has no tort
liability to the buyer if the buyer suffers economic loss. If the attorney
negligently prepares the instrument, resulting in economic loss to the buyer, the
buyer does not have a cause of action against the attorney for negligence because
the attorney owes no duty to the adversarial third party to protect that third
party's expectations. The relationship between attorney and buyer, as dictated
by the seller-client, is an adversarial one. The seller-client thus controls
whether the attorney has a duty to protect the commercial expectations of the
third party or not. The reason for such a rule, again, is that the adversarial
relationship that a client may wish to maintain between his attorney and the third
party is compromised if the attorney is forced to consider the commercial
expectations of the third party.

281. 2314 Lincoln Park W., 555 N.E.2d at 353; Joan Teshima, Annotation, Attorney's Liability,
to One Other than Immediate Client, for Negligence in Connection with Legal Duties, 61 A.L.R.
4TH 615 (1988) (referring to third-party liability of attorneys).
282. 2314 Lincoln Park W., 555 N.E.2d at 353.
283. See Angel, Cohen & Rogovin v. Oberon Inv., N.V., 512 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1987). In
Angel, a corporation brought an action against a law firm for negligence in helping the firm's client
prepare sale documents transferring the corporation's wholly owned subsidiary to the client while
simultaneously arranging a second transaction reselling the same property to a third party at a profit
and thus defrauding the corporation. Id. at 193. The court held that the law firm would not be
liable to the corporation where the corporation was not the client of the law firm and thus lacked the
requisite privity customarily required to maintain an action for negligence against the attorney. Id.
at 194. Even if the law firm knew the client was a fiduciary of the corporation and knew of the
potential conflict between the interests of its client and the corporation, tort liability would not lie.
Id. Also, the corporation was not a third-party beneficiary since the corporation was incidental and
not the intended beneficiary of the transaction. Id.
See also Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 266 S.E.2d 108 (Va. 1980). In Ayyildiz, a doctor sued an attorney
who had represented the doctor's insurer under a theory that the attorney was negligent in failing
to investigate the plaintiffs claim. Id. at 110. The court held that the attorney had no legal duty
to the doctor and was not liable in negligence to him. Id. at 133. See generally National Say. Bank
v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879); Firestone v. Galbreath, 976 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1992); Skarbrevik
v. Cohen, England & Whitfield, 282 Cal. Rptr. 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Hopkins v. Akins, 637
A.2d 424 (D.C. 1993); Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen & Heilbronner, 612 So. 2d 1378
(Fla. 1993); Weiss v. Manfredi, 639 N.E.2d 1122 (N.Y. 1994); Teshima, supra note 281.
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This position can be applied to the construction context. In the traditional
delivery system of construction contracts," the owner specifically chooses to
have an adversarial relationship between architect and contractor-a relationship
lacking privity."5 Presumably, the owner could have chosen other means of
project delivery which do not maintain an adversarial relationship between
architect and contractor.'
Thus, only by the express choice of the owner
does the relationship between architect and contractor become adversarial.
If courts do not apply the economic loss doctrine in the traditional delivery
system, all architects, negligent and non-negligent, will be forced to consider the
commercial expectations of contractors.37
The effect on non-negligent
architects is that, even though the plans and specifications are prepared without
breaching the professional standard of care,'
they might consider the
commercial expectations of the contractor more important than those of the
owner. In such a jurisdiction, the prudent architect would see potential future
liability both from the owner, with whom it has privity, and the contractor, with
whom it has no privity. The architect determines how to conform its conduct
based on which of the two is more litigious, rather than solely on privity
grounds.
In the introductory hypothetical scenario, Pharmatech had good reason to
keep Archiwerks and Capital Construction adverse to one another-namely to
protect the interests of Pharmatech. One of Archiwerks' duties under its contract
with Pharmatech was to approve shop drawings.'89 Archiwerks thus had a
contractual duty, as Pharmatech's agent, to protect Pharmatech's interest in a
building which would, among other things, withstand deterioration.'
Concomitant with this interest was a concern about how "painless" would
withstand the effects of weather over time. Conversely, Capital was probably
not interested in how "painless" would withstand the effects of weather. It had
an interest in profiting from the construction, which would be enhanced through
the use of the cheaper material. The interest of Pharmatech in quality is thus
directly in conflict with Capital's interest in profit. Archiwerks is somewhere
in the middle of this battle. Whether the economic loss doctrine is applied or
not has a direct bearing on where Archiwerks "stands" with respect to the two

284. See infra APPENDIX A.
285. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
287. See supra note 283 and accompanying text (discussing problems with third party liability
of attorneys).
288. B141, supra note 27,
1.1.2. See also supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text
(discussing an architect's professional standard of care).
289. B141, supra note 27, 2.6.12.
290. See supra notes 220-28 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of a design
professional's duty).
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opposing interests. If the economic loss doctrine is not applied as a per se rule
to bar tort actions, Archiwerks will have to consider these opposing interests
equally, even though its sole contract is with Pharmatech. This situation exists
because not considering the commercial expectations of Capital will open
Archiwerks up to possible tort liability from Capital in the future.
Suppose Archiwerks had reviewed the specifications prepared by its office
after receiving Capital's submittal for "painless" and determined that the
specifications were probably ambiguous as to what tests would be required of
"equals" submitted by Capital before they would be approved. Based on this
determination, Archiwerks may choose to approve the submittal rather than
require the additional testing out of fear of tort liability from Capital. If such
a fear was greater than its fear of possible contractual liability to Pharmatech,
Archiwerks' contractual obligations would be subordinated to those in tort.
Adopting a per se rule against tort liability with respect to the traditional
delivery system would not leave contractors who have been harmed by the
negligence of architects without a remedy. Had Archiwerks breached its
standard of care in its preparation of plans and specifications in a jurisdiction
which followed the economic loss doctrine, Capital would not be able to sue
Archiwerks directly in tort. But Capital would still have a cause of action
against Pharmatech for breach of contract." 9 Pharmatech could, in turn,
The party
assign its right to sue Archiwerks in contract to Capital.'
ultimately liable would thus be found even without the tort action.
However, allowing tort recovery in the traditional delivery system would
have adverse consequences on the system as a whole. If Archiwerks had not,
in fact, breached the standard of care, it would still be forced to consider the
commercial expectations of Capital before approving or rejecting the shop
drawings depicting "painless." Archiwerks would have to decide whether the
threat of tort litigation in not approving the shop drawings was as great as
approving them and opening itself up to possible contract liability to
Pharmatech. Since Pharmatech chose the relationship between architect and
contractor to be an adversarial one, Archiwerks' loyalty should be solely with
Pharmatech. In this way, Archiwerks can perform its contract as the owner's
agent without feeling threatened with potential tort liability by Capital.
Enforcing the economic loss doctrine in the traditional delivery system
relieves the prudent architect from feeling compelled to compromise its
contractual relationship with the owner in order to protect the commercial

291. Steffey, supra note 102, at 681-82.
292. Id. at681.
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expectations of the contractor 93 Allowing a cause of action in tort for
economic loss in the traditional delivery system is simply too broad in its
application in that it compromises even the prudent architect's contractual
relationship with the owner. The duty to protect the commercial expectations
of the contractor in the traditional delivery system should therefore not lie with
the architect.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The economic loss doctrine should be applied in the traditional delivery
system as a per se rule to deny recovery of economic loss by a contractor
against an architect. If courts reject the theory that contract law is better suited
to deal with economic loss than tort law, a tort analysis can be engaged in with
the same result. Although negligence and negligent misrepresentation are
appealing in that the economic harm to users of information negligently supplied
by the architect are foreseeable to that architect, the architect should owe no
duty to protect such interests of such users because of the adversarial nature of
the traditional delivery system. Refusing to apply the economic loss doctrine
undermines this adversarial relationship and will result in removing the
traditional delivery system as a viable option in the construction industry.

293. See supra notes 280, 283 and accompanying text (discussing problems with third party
liability of other professionals).
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APPENDIX

A. Diagram of the TraditionalDelivery System of Construction Contracts

0

A .............................
0

-Owner

A

-Architect

C

-Contractor

C

-Contractual relations between parties. See B 141, supra note 27
(contract between the architect and owner); A201, supra note 28
(contract between the contractor and owner).
-The cause of action prohibited by the economic loss doctrine (because
no contractual privity exists).

The owner contracts with the architect for design and construction
observation services via the B141. The owner then contracts with the contractor
for construction services via the A201. The plans and specifications, as part of
the contract documents which the architect prepares, are the documents the
contractor follows to build the building. The owner chooses this method, in
part, in order to keep the architect and contractor adverse to one another. The
economic loss doctrine prevents a cause of action (represented by the dashed
line) by the contractor against the architect for purely economic loss. See supra
notes 23-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the traditional delivery
system.
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B. Diagramof the Design/BuildSystem of Construction Contracts-A Modern
Variation of the TraditionalDelivery System

0

I

A
0

-Owner

D/B

-Design/Build Firm

A

-Architect

C

-Contractor

C

-Contractual relations between parties.

Here, in contrast to the traditional delivery system, the owner has no
contract with either the architect or the contractor. The design/build firm is
responsible to the owner for both design and construction services. Some
design/build firms have both design and construction services on staff.
Otherwise the firm contracts these services out to others. The point is that the
design/build firm, the architect, and the contractor, rather than acting as
adversaries as in the traditional delivery system, act as a "team" to provide a
complete building to the owner. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the design/build delivery system.
Michael T. Terwilliger
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